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Law and Local Activism: Uncovering the
Civil Rights History of Chambers v.
Mississippi
Emily Prifogle*
Countless academics have examined and discussed the
importance of Chambers v. Mississippi in a multitude of areas
including compulsory due process, admission of hearsay, third party
guilt evidence, false confessions, racial evaluations of hearsay and
witnesses, and morally reasonable verdicts. In contrast, this
Comment attempts to excavate the account of a rural Mississippi
community’s struggle for rights that underlies the U.S. Supreme
Court decision in Chambers. On its face, the case has no link or
reference to the civil rights movement. However, this Comment
reveals that local civil rights activists took armed, direct economic
action for equal rights in Woodville, Mississippi, and that activism
characterized the events that precipitated the June 14, 1969, killing
of Officer Aaron Liberty—Woodville’s black police officer. The
article concludes by developing two interrelated claims: in the
narrative—which takes place in the gap between secured rights and
local realities—law is both everywhere and nowhere. National
litigation influenced the terms of exchange between the local
movement and white opposition, while micromobilizations of the law
through local law enforcement continually operated to suppress civil
rights activity. At the same time, there was an absence of legal
protections for the black community, who in response mobilized an
extralegal self-defense group to bolster the power of boycotts and
protect black neighborhoods.
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INTRODUCTION
On a Saturday night in the summer of 1969, an altercation took place in
Woodville, Mississippi, that left a police officer dead and the man eventually
convicted of his murder severely wounded.1 Ultimately, the U.S. Supreme
Court overturned that conviction in Chambers v. Mississippi.2 Justice Lewis
Powell’s short opinion contained a concise and sanitized recitation of the facts:
the incident began when police officers Liberty and Forman entered a bar and
pool hall to execute an arrest warrant for C.C. Jackson.3 Upon confrontation
with the warrant, Jackson refused and resisted arrest.4 Quickly, a crowd of
twenty or twenty-five individuals prevented the officers from completing the
arrest.5 Officer Forman radioed for backup while Officer Liberty took his riot
gun from the patrol car.6 When the three additional backup officers arrived,
they joined Forman in a second attempt to arrest Jackson.7 This time, the crowd
repelled all four officers.8

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 285–87 (1973).
Id. at 303.
Id. at 285.
Id.
Id. at 285–86.
Id. at 286.
Id.
Id.
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During the scuffle, five or six pistol shots were fired.9 Liberty, hit in the
back, staggered as he turned toward the direction from which the shots came.10
He returned two shots from the riot gun: the first “wild and high,” the second
“more deliberate.”11 The second shot filled Leon Chambers’s neck and head
with buckshot.12 Leaving Chambers for dead in the alley, the four remaining
officers rushed Liberty to the hospital.13 At the same time, James Williams,
Berkley Turner, and Gable McDonald found Chambers still alive in the alley
and rushed him to the same hospital.14 Of the two gunshot victims, only
Chambers made it to the hospital alive; Liberty died en route.15 Before dawn,
the local sheriff had already placed guards at Chambers’s hospital door; he was
charged with murder soon after.16
While Chambers recovered in the hospital, McDonald confessed to
shooting Liberty at least three times to close friends.17 He also gave a sworn
confession for the shooting to Chambers’s attorneys.18 However, by October
1970, when Chambers was set for trial, McDonald had recanted his sworn
confession.19 At trial, Mississippi’s rules of evidence prevented McDonald’s
oral confessions from being presented to the jury because they were deemed
inadmissible hearsay.20 In the end, the jury convicted Chambers of murder and
sentenced him to life in prison.21
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the conviction, holding that
Chambers had not received a fair trial.22 In its decision, the Court focused
solely on whether Chambers should have been allowed to present McDonald’s
oral confessions to the jury.23 Mississippi rules of evidence excluded these
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 286.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 287.
15. Id. at 286–87.
16. Id. at 287.
17. See id. at 289.
18. Id. at 289.
19. Id. at 288.
20. Id. at 289–94. Black’s Law Dictionary defines hearsay as “[t]raditionally, testimony that is
given by a witness who relates not what he or she knows personally, but what others have said, and
that is therefore dependent on the credibility of someone other than the witness. Such testimony is
generally inadmissible under the rules of evidence.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 739 (8th ed. 2004). It
also explains the hearsay rule as
[t]he rule that no assertion offered as testimony can be received unless it is or has been open
to test by cross-examination or an opportunity for cross-examination, except as provided
otherwise by the rules of evidence, by court rules, or by statute. The chief reasons for the
rule are that out-of-court statements amounting to hearsay are not made under oath and are
not subject to cross-examination.
Id. The Federal Rules of Evidence provide several exceptions to the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 803.
21. Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217, 220 (Miss. 1971) (per curiam).
22. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 303 (1973).
23. See id. at 295–302.
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types of confessions even though they would have made McDonald appear less
credible at trial. However, the Court’s constitutional decision—grounded in the
right to a fair trial—annulled Mississippi’s unfair evidence rules.
Justice Powell’s summary of the facts, though brief, has become familiar
to many. Hundreds of attorneys have compared the details of their own cases to
Chambers, seeking paths around hearsay rules and seemingly unfair trials, most
often unsuccessfully.24 Law students nationwide study this account in their
Evidence courses.25 Countless academics have examined and discussed the
importance of Chambers to legal theories of compulsory due process,
admission of hearsay, third party guilt evidence, false confessions, racial
evaluations of hearsay and witnesses, and morally reasonable verdicts.26 Yet
the Court’s account of the circumstances surrounding Chambers’s conviction
obscures as much as it reveals. Although the opinion does not include a single
reference to any party’s race, the case was intimately tied to the struggle for
racial equality in a rural Mississippi town.
This Comment uncovers the complicated local civil rights battle that
underlies the Chambers decision. The recovered narrative reveals a campaign
of local, armed, direct economic action against white oppression in Woodville,
and this successful civil rights activity was the backdrop for the killing of
Officer Liberty. Thus, the narrative that emerges is important for three reasons.
First, it supports and enriches the growing literature on localized armed selfdefense in the 1950s and 1960s South.27 Second, it illuminates how the U.S.
24. An April 22, 2011, Westlaw search for the citing history of Chambers produced, including
dissents, 1900 federal cases citing to Chambers and over 2500 state cases doing the same. There were
even six international cases discussing the decision. With regard to law review articles, Westlaw
contained 901 law review articles citing to the opinion. For a more in-depth analysis of cases and
literature referring to Chambers, see Stephan Landsman, Chambers v. Mississippi: A New Justice
Meets An Old Style Southern Verdict, in EVIDENCE STORIES, 359, 380–81 n.35 (Richard Lempert ed.,
2006).
25. See, e.g., DAVID ALAN SKLANSKY, EVIDENCE: CASES, COMMENTARY AND PROBLEMS
258 (3d ed. 2012).
26. See, e.g., John H. Blume et al., Every Juror Wants a Story: Narrative Relevance, Third
Party Guilt and the Right to Present a Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1069 (2007); Andrew Elliot
Carpenter, Chambers v. Mississippi: The Hearsay Rule and Racial Evaluations of Credibility, 8
WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANC. L.J. 15 (2002); First Lieutenant John A. Carr, The Admissibility
of Polygraph Evidence in Court-Martial Proceedings: Does the Constitution Mandate the
Gatekeeper?, 43 A.F. L. REV. 1 (1997); Robert N. Clinton, The Right to Present a Defense: An
Emergent Constitutional Guarantee in Criminal Trials, 9 IND. L. REV. 711 (1976); Janet C. Hoeffel,
The Sixth Amendment’s Lost Clause: Unearthing Compulsory Process, 2002 WIS. L. REV. 1275;
Landsman, supra note 24, at 379–81; Colin Miller, Dismissed with Prejudice: Why Application of the
Anti-Jury Impeachment Rule to Allegations of Racial, Religious, or Other Bias Violates the Right to
Present a Defense, 61 BAYLOR L. REV. 872 (2009); Nadia Soree, When the Innocent Speak: False
Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards, and the Role of Expert Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191
(2005); Peter Westen, The Compulsory Process Clause, 73 MICH. L. REV. 71 (1974); Joan Friedman
Krey, Note, Chambers v. Mississippi: Due Process and the Rules of Evidence, 35 U. PITT. L. REV. 725
(1974).
27. By referring to the “South” in this paper, I refer to the geographic area with a distinct
history and culture that informed the decisions of the communities discussed in this Comment. I do not
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Supreme Court and the justice system more generally can erase civil and
political dissent from the legal record. In pruning the facts down to the
“essentials,” legal decision makers may intentionally or unintentionally sever
legal controversies from the contexts in which they arose. Third, this narrative
shows how civil rights activists who did not seek to use litigation as a social
movement tactic nonetheless were compelled to interact with the law due to the
local white mobilization of criminal law against blacks and the lack of police
protection of black communities from Klan and extremist violence.
The narrative constructed in this Comment emphasizes individual agency
“while also dramatizing the hidden history of policies and institutions . . . that
continually shape and reshape the social landscape yet are often invisible.”28
Consequently, this project fits well with and builds upon exciting developments
in the historiography of civil rights and sociolegal change. Part of an emerging
body of literature, it looks beyond the national school desegregation litigation
strategy that resulted in Brown v. Board of Education29 and beyond the
textbook narrative of a national, unified civil rights movement.30 As a handful
of academics31 have illustrated, we have much to gain from localized studies
mean to suggest that racism was or is a purely southern phenomenon or to suggest that discrimination
and subordination were not and are not issues affecting other regions of the country. Cf. Jacquelyn
Dowd Hall, The Long Civil Rights Movement and the Political Uses of the Past, 91 J. AM. HIST. 1233,
1233, 1239 (2005).
28. Id. at 1262–63.
29. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
30. For an excellent summary of the master narrative in the context of a critique of it, see
CHARLES M. PAYNE, I’VE GOT THE LIGHT OF FREEDOM: THE ORGANIZING TRADITION AND THE
MISSISSIPPI FREEDOM STRUGGLE xiii–xiv (2d ed. 2007). Charles Payne refers to the civil “[m]aster
[n]arrative” as so familiar that it is nearly “a form of civic religion.” Id. at xiii. Payne writes that this
simplified master narrative of the civil rights movement began with oppressive race relations in the
postwar South. The narrative continued as the Supreme Court decided Brown and inspired blacks and
whites to protest against southern prejudice. Martin Luther King Jr. and a sympathetic federal
administration helped frame discrimination as a moral issue for the country. Accordingly, after
Americans understood it was wrong to discriminate, they helped pass the Civil Rights Acts. Id.
Thankfully, by the time King was assassinated, the country had largely changed because the civil
rights movement had been a success for the entire country. Still, by the 1970s when things had
improved so greatly for blacks, many nonetheless turned to Black Power and against American
society. Id. at xiv.
Like Payne, Hall critiques the master narrative and suggests that the “truer story” is that of the
“long civil rights movement.” Hall, supra note 27, at 1235. Hall argues that in this truer account, the
movement
took root in the liberal and radical milieu of the late 1930s, was intimately tied to the “rise
and fall of the New Deal Order,” accelerated during World War II, stretched far beyond the
South, was continuously and ferociously contested, and in the 1960s and 1970s inspired a
“movement of movements” that “def[ies] any narrative of collapse.”
Id. (internal citations omitted).
31. See, e.g., JOHN DITTMER, LOCAL PEOPLE: THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS IN
MISSISSIPPI (1994); LANCE HILL, THE DEACONS FOR DEFENSE: ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE CIVIL
RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2004); PAYNE, supra note 30, at xix; CHRISTOPHER B. STRAIN, PURE FIRE:
SELF-DEFENSE AS ACTIVISM IN THE CIVIL RIGHTS ERA (2005); Emilye J. Crosby, “You Got a Right
to Defend Yourself”: Self-Defense and the Claiborne County, Mississippi Civil Rights Movement, 9
INT’L J. AFRICANA STUD. 133 (2003), available at http://gateway.proquest.com/openurl?url_ver=
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focusing on “rural communities, grassroots activism, and the organizing
tradition” around local issues.32 Such studies, according to Crosby, show that
“the most familiar narratives and the normative histories of the [civil rights]
movement[] typically over-emphasize major events, the ideology of
nonviolence, the efficacy of moral suasion, the role of whites, and the activism
of the federal government, while minimizing or obscuring local people and
bottom-up perspectives.”33 Localized histories have revealed the importance of
self-defense groups in rural southern organizing for civil rights.34 Moreover,
this scholarship has provided an alternative to the traditional understanding that
the Black Panthers ideology represented an “abrupt rupture” with prior civil
rights activities.35 Indeed, these authors have found that self-defense actions
were widespread across the South throughout the civil rights movement and
integral to local organizing efforts.36 Threads of these conclusions are found
woven through the narrative of Woodville’s local activism, which relied
heavily on self-defense groups—members of which were intricately linked with
the death of Officer Liberty.
For the activists in Woodville, litigation was not a favored strategy,
although the law was intimately intertwined with their actions. Hence, this
project adds an interesting data point to the study of litigation as a social
movement tactic and the Court’s ability to effect change. For example, Gerald
Rosenberg’s Hollow Hope suggests that the Court’s decision in Brown, due to
constraints on the Court’s ability to effect change, did not have the mythical

Z39.88-2004&res_dat=xri:bsc:&rft_dat=xri:bsc ft:iibp:00250753; Akinyele O. Umoja, 1964: The
Beginning of the End of Nonviolence in the Mississippi Freedom Movement, 85 RADICAL HIST. REV.
201 (2003); Akinyele O. Umoja, The Ballot and the Bullet: A Comparative Analysis of Armed
Resistance in the Civil Rights Movement, 29 J. BLACK STUD. 558 (1999); Akinyele Omowale Umoja,
“We Will Shoot Back:” The Natchez Model and Paramilitary Organization in the Mississippi
Freedom Movement, 32 J. BLACK STUD. 271 (2002) [hereinafter Umoja, The Natchez Model]; see also
SIMON WENDT, THE SPIRIT AND THE SHOTGUN: ARMED RESISTANCE AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CIVIL
RIGHTS (2007).
32. Crosby, supra note 31, at *2.
33. Id.; see also PAYNE, supra note 30, at xiv.
34. See, e.g., PAYNE, supra note 30, at xiv–xv; STRAIN, supra note 31; WENDT, supra note 31;
Crosby, supra note 31; Hall, supra note 27. These accounts have also led to new explorations of
closely connected issues of gender and class within the black community, geography and chronology,
the role of outsiders and whites in grassroots organizing, the role of national civil rights organizations,
the role of the federal government, the role of the labor movement, as well as the role of black
churches in creating sustained and meaningful changes in local communities.
35. Simon Wendt, Protection or Path Toward Revolution?: Black Power and Self-Defense, 9
SOULS: CRITICAL J. BLACK POL., CULTURE & SOC’Y 320, 321 (2007).
36. Id.; see also, e.g., STRAIN, supra note 31; TIMOTHY B. TYSON, RADIO FREE DIXIE:
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS & THE ROOTS OF BLACK POWER 307–08 (1999); WENDT, supra note 31. Tyson
argues that characterizing the civil rights movement prior to the emergence of Black Power as
nonviolent “idealizes black history, downplays the oppression of Jim Crow society, and even
understates the achievements of African American resistance.” TYSON, supra, at 307. Indeed, “armed
self-reliance operated side by side in the South, in uneasy partnership with legal efforts and nonviolent
protest.” Id. at 308.
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societal impact that is so central to the “master narrative.”37 Similarly, Michael
Klarman’s work on Brown exposes a more complex narrative around the
decision. It reveals in part how, rather than creating beneficial changes for
blacks, the decision resulted in widespread backlash and “counterintuitive”
contributions to the civil rights movement.38 And more recently, Risa
Goluboff’s study of New Deal and NAACP labor litigation presents a new
narrative of the origins of civil rights litigation, describing how the Brown
decision marginalized labor litigation and obscured the harms experienced by
many blacks before, during, and after the civil rights movement.39 Yet, in the
recovered narrative of Woodville civil rights activism, these developments are
largely in the background, only abstractly framing the localized concrete
contestation over equal rights. Indeed, this perspective misses much of how the
local movement interacted with the law.40
Similarly, at the local level, this project speaks to a body of literature on
intracommunity conflicts over representation in movement goals. For example,
Tomiko Brown-Nagin’s work highlights tensions within black communities
through a localized study and finds that conflicts shaped by generational and
class diversity affected represented interests within the movement.41 Partly in
response to that concern, Brown-Nagin asks, “What would the story of the
mid-twentieth-century struggle for civil rights look like if legal historians
de-centered the U.S. Supreme Court, the national NAACP, and the NAACP
LDF and instead considered the movement from the bottom up?”42 The answer
to that question, she argues, is only found when examining local
communities—a crucial perspective, because it was local communities that

37. GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL
CHANGE? (2d ed. 2008).
38. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND THE CIVIL RIGHTS
MOVEMENTS (2007).
39. See generally RISA L. GOLUBOFF, THE LOST PROMISE OF CIVIL RIGHTS (2007).
40. See Kenneth W. Mack, Law and Local Knowledge in the History of the Civil Rights
Movement, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1018, 1031–34 (2012) (reviewing TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE
TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT (2011)).
Despite its historical orientation, this particular school of thought has focused more on the
question of what the Court can and cannot do as a general matter than on the more
contextual question of how blacks and whites actually responded to the Court, and engaged
with law more generally, during the civil rights era. The first of these questions is likely to
prompt serious interest from political scientists and scholars of constitutional law, while the
second is of more interest to historians. That is, a political scientist might ask a question like
this: when and how can the Supreme Court be an effective proponent of social change? A
historian, by contrast, would ask: how did blacks and whites respond to a world in which
Brown had been decided? Historians are committed to explaining what happened in a
particular context, while many political scientists are comfortable explaining trans-historical
phenomena.
Id. at 1031.
41. See generally TOMIKO BROWN-NAGIN, COURAGE TO DISSENT: ATLANTA AND THE LONG
HISTORY OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS MOVEMENT 9 (2011).
42. Id. at 7.
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experienced the gap between legal gains in civil rights and remedies on the
ground.43 That gap is where Woodville’s recovered narrative takes place.
Thus, the most potent contribution of this Comment is using the localized
history to examine the ways in which legal structures and institutions both did
and did not affect local activists in Woodville. National nonviolent and legal
strategies were either not useful or were unwanted tactics in the local
movement’s struggle for civil rights. However, local legal institutions,
structures, and actors—courts, ordinances, police—were constant sites of
contestation and reaction as well as tools exploited by the town’s powerful
officials to suppress civil rights activism. And, even though law still framed
many sites of contestation, it is also important to recognize the power of
economic leverage—separate from legal strategies or contests—that was
employed both by and against the activists and larger black community. The
struggle for civil rights in Woodville was not solely a legal struggle: not all
tactics for legal change must be legal in nature, and not all struggles for
equality are for legal rights.
Part I provides the localized context in which the Chambers shooting took
place. Accordingly, this Part proceeds by broadly outlining the civil rights
movement in Mississippi, where most national organizations encountered
difficulties. Then, this Part describes life and civil rights activism in Woodville,
Mississippi, demonstrating that in addition to disenfranchisement and
segregation, local law enforcement and the justice system also posed significant
obstacles to activists and citizens who were struggling to achieve civil rights.
Thus, this portion of the Comment reveals the pragmatic necessity of selfdefense organizations and armed boycott enforcement.
Part II uses archival materials, including newspapers, court records, and
interviews to provide a more complete account of June 14, 1969, and the events
underlying the decision in Chambers. This fuller account reveals police
brutality and hasty police investigations, as well as crafty maneuvering by the
Deacons for Defense—an organized black self-defense group. Although
Woodville’s civil rights activists felt the influence of national litigation and
even attempted to mobilize a suit or two themselves, they most frequently
encountered law as a tool of oppression used by white officials. Accordingly,
Part II also presents an account of Chambers’s trial and subsequent appeal
process. An examination of the legal proceedings uncovers a justice system
operating on an unfair playing field.
Part III uses the recovered narrative to develop two interrelated claims. In
the narrative—which takes place in the gap between secured rights and on-theground realities—law is both everywhere and nowhere. National litigation
influenced the terms of exchange between the local movement and white
opposition, while micromobilizations of the law, primarily through local law
43.

Id. at 8.
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enforcement, continually operated to suppress civil rights activity. At the same
time, there was an absence of legal protections for the black community, which
in response mobilized extralegal self-defense groups to bolster the power of
boycotts and protests as well as to protect black neighborhoods.
I.
CHAMBERS IN CONTEXT
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Chambers offers not as much a
window into localized civil rights activity, but rather a door. On its face, the
Supreme Court decision does not expose its potential impact for blacks in
southern courtrooms, nor does the opinion inform the reader of the struggle that
sparked a black police officer’s death. Yet, by opening the door to facts behind
the Supreme Court decision, one enters into a robust and dramatic narrative of
civil rights activity. Walking through that door is an important endeavor
because it illuminates connections between the local social movement activity
and the law that are obscured by the appeals process. It also reconnects the
facts examined by the Court with the context from which they arose. This Part
first briefly looks to broad organizing activity in Mississippi before discussing
the specific forms of subordination experienced by blacks in Woodville.
Finally, the community’s local movement activity is detailed.
A. Civil Rights Organizing in Mississippi
After Brown, racial extremists in the South captured and focused the
nation’s attention on Mississippi.44 And yet the national attention that resulted
from civil rights fatalities, as well as the rallies and marches called in their
wake, had little direct impact on life in rural communities like Woodville,
Mississippi. Even into the late 1960s, Mississippi was a self-contained world,
closed off to outsiders in travel, trade, news, and education.45 One journalist
described the southwest corner of Mississippi where Woodville sits “as not
only having missed the civil rights movement but the Industrial Revolution as

44. In 1955, Emmett Till, a black Chicago youth visiting family in Money, Mississippi, was
murdered. The subsequent trial of his alleged murderers garnered much northern attention. See PAYNE,
supra note 30, at 39–40 (“[t]he Till case attracted the most sustained notice outside [of Mississippi]”).
In 1961, the freedom riders traveling across the South were viciously attacked on their way to
Mississippi. Id. at 107–08; DITTMER, supra note 31, at 170–73 (describing a similar incident in 1963).
In 1962, James Meredith’s integration of Ole Miss left two men, including a reporter, dead. Id. at 138–
42. In 1963, Medgar Evers, the NAACP field secretary for Mississippi, was murdered outside his
home as he returned from an organizing meeting. Id. at 165–67. On a single night in May 1964,
crosses burned in sixty-four of Mississippi’s eighty-two counties. Id. at 215. That same year, gaining
even more national attention, three civil rights activists—including two white northerners—were
murdered. Id. at 247–49. In 1966, James Meredith was shot during his solo March Against Fear.
PAYNE, supra note 30, at 376.
45. DITTMER, supra note 31, at 59.
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well.”46 Accordingly, the problems of the South and Mississippi were two-fold:
part economic disparity and part societal oppression.47
Black veterans in particular felt the sting of both economic and social
oppression. Needless to say, all blacks in Mississippi were acutely aware of the
racial killings and lynchings that lay beneath the surface of daily life.48
Additionally, widespread economic reprisals against blacks engendered fear in
many. Support for the NAACP or the Voters’ League could cost a job, a
business, or a home. And yet, the over 85,000 black Mississippians who fought
in World War II49 returned home to some of the worst labor conditions in the
country.50 In addition to economic difficulties, veterans returned home to
encounter whites who attempted to ensure that black veterans would neither
expect nor demand even the limited respect they had enjoyed while in northern
bases and abroad.51 Despite these consequences, it was veterans who
spearheaded organizations for equal rights in the post-war era.52
Local legal systems both condoned and executed race-based social and
economic oppression. Indeed, Mississippi’s legal system was the arbiter of Jim
Crow for everything from legal determinations of one’s race for miscegenation
laws to civil awards for libel when a newspaper misidentified a person as
black.53 Throughout the 1950s and 1960s authorities frequently used crimes
like disturbing the peace as a pretext to arrest and detain civil rights activists.
District Attorneys would then drop the charges against key civil rights leaders
after marches concluded. Other unconstitutional local laws enabled law

46. Annelieke Dirks, Between Threat and Reality: The National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People and the Emergence of Armed Self-Defense in Clarksdale and
Natchez, Mississippi, 1960–1965, 1 J. FOR STUDY RADICALISM 71, 85 (2006).
47. See generally GOLUBOFF, supra note 39, at 16–80. Societal oppression refers to the types
of subordination resulting from the use of state and social institutions such as the denial of the vote,
inequality in education, and social conventions.
48. PAYNE, supra note 30, at 15.
49. DITTMER, supra note 31, at 17.
50. At the time, Mississippi was the only state with no worker’s compensation law and no
labor department. Id. at 23.
51. Id. at 16–18 (discussing in part a race riot that broke out at a military base in Centreville,
Mississippi—not far from Woodville—that was sparked by the Wilkinson county sheriff shooting a
black private). See PAYNE, supra note 30, at 31; see also TYSON, supra note 36, at 26–48. Tyson
recounts one striking story about a Georgia veteran who was murdered after a dispute with his
landlord. One of his murderers explained “Up until George went in the army, he was a good
nigger. . . . But when he came out, they thought they were as good as any white people.” Id. at 54.
Perhaps the most famous is example is that of Robert Williams, who was unable to acclimate
himself to the racial traditions of Monroe, North Carolina, after service in World War II. Id. at 27; see
also ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, NEGROES WITH GUNS (1962). Robert Williams and many black veterans
across the South served as leaders in civil rights activities, and many of those leaders made use of their
newfound and disciplined military skills in fighting for equal rights. See, e.g., TYSON, supra note 36, at
26–48.
52. See, e.g., TYSON, supra note 36.
53. See id. at 20–21. Sex crimes and interracial affairs drew particularly harsh sentences for
black men, if they were not first lynched. Id. at 22.
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enforcement to confiscate legally held and permitted guns from blacks.54
Simple traffic tickets could be used to remind the black community of the
social hierarchy.55 Accordingly, the vast discretion vested in local law
enforcement officers combined with many officers’ known participation in the
Klan resulted in a blatantly corrupt justice system.
Thus, as a consequence of multifarious oppression, Mississippi was a
difficult state for national civil rights organizations—most never made inroads
there. Even organizations like the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee
(SNCC), who were able to make footholds in the state, were still never able to
enter the areas most strongly held by the Klan. Further, the leading civil rights
umbrella organization that directed most organized civil rights activity in the
state, the Council of Federated Organizations (COFO), collapsed by 1965 due
to intramovement conflict and politics.56
Moreover, when statewide and national organizations entered into rural
Mississippi, they were forced to confront an internal strain within the
movement. In part, the strain resulted from tension between a national
ideological commitment to nonviolence and the local on-the-ground necessity
for self-defense.57 The national organizations needed to appeal to northern
sympathy through moral suasion for funding. Further exacerbating the strain
over goals was a clear class divide within the black community.58 Additionally,
as Professor Lance Hill puts it, the “black community had its share of traitors,
rascals, and ordinary fools.”59 Thus, no single monolithic civil rights movement
with unified goals existed. Rather, a diversity of interests vying for
representation within local black communities gave rise to internal strains and
conflict.
Further, the dispute within the movement over the strategy of self-defense
was not minor.60 Despite the “cinematic” civil rights narrative depicting
nonviolent black marchers,61 behind-the-scenes attacks from nightriders,
Klansmen, and armed law enforcement necessitated self-protective uses of
54. David T. Beito & Linda Royster Beito, Blacks, Gun Cultures, and Gun Control: T.R.M.
Howard, Armed Self-Defense, and the Struggle for Civil Rights in Mississippi, 17 J. ON FIREARMS &
PUB. POL’Y 133,136 (2005); Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment:
Toward an Afro-Americanist Reconsideration, 80 GEO. L.J. 309, 344 n.177 (1991).
55. See infra notes 153, 194 and accompanying text.
56. DITTMER, supra note 31, at 343–46.
57. For a discussion in the context of Robert Williams’s self-defense actions and advocacy, see
TYSON, supra note 36, at 262, 264, 290–91.
58. See, e.g., Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests
in School Desegregation Litigation, 85 YALE L.J. 470 (1976) (examining the ways in which civil
rights attorneys often had divergent interests from blacks impacted by NAACP litigation at the local
level); cf. BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 41, at 7 (exploring multidimensional black interests and
intragroup conflict); GOLUBOFF, supra note 39, at 237 (describing how labor and employment issues
were not addressed in the NAACP legal strategy).
59. HILL, supra note 31, at 15.
60. See, e.g., STRAIN, supra note 31.
61. See TYSON, supra note 36, at 307.
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force.62 Reasons for preserving a nonviolent image were many: some were
ideologically committed to the strategy; others preferred the strategy as the best
for achieving civil rights on a national stage.63 Still, even though civil rights
organizations accepted armed defense from local groups, the protection was
never publicized because it would have resulted in immediate losses in funding
from northern whites.64
Nevertheless, rural blacks participated in local movement activity on their
own terms. SNCC leader Bob Moses observed during the 1960s that it was “not
contradictory for a farmer to say he’s nonviolent and also pledge to shoot a
marauder’s head off.”65 SNCC organizers often joked about local farmers who
would carry their “nonviolent Winchesters” to meetings.66 Rural blacks in
Woodville likewise participated in the civil rights movement on their own
terms: the Deacons for Defense. A small self-defense organization, the Deacons
first formed in Jonesboro, Louisiana, with the purpose of protecting civil rights
activists from the Klan and other vigilantes.67 Lance Hill68 has argued that
throughout the southeast Louisiana and southwest Mississippi region, the
Deacons’ armed protective efforts were needed because of the combination of
the Klan’s increasing stronghold in the area and the complete lack of official
enforcement of civil rights legislation.69
Although it began as an entirely secret association, the group became
public in early 1965, and by 1966 there were over twenty chapters.70 Unlike the
NAACP and Voters’ Leagues that traditionally had a middle-class membership,
working-class men formed the Deacons.71 Deacons tended to be veterans, and
most belonged to one or more fraternal clubs like the Masons or Elks.72 The
Deacons granted membership only to mature and reputable men in the
community, screening out those with quick tempers.73 Members’ military
backgrounds and leadership experience from fraternal organizations made the
Deacons a highly organized and disciplined armed self-defense group.
Membership rolls were kept secret, save for a few public leaders, so that local
law enforcement, the Klan, and the FBI were unable to accurately estimate the
62. See id.; HILL, supra note 31; WENDT, supra note 31; STRAIN, supra note 31.
63. The issue continued to be debated within SNCC throughout the 1960s, but only late in the
decade did the organization decide to officially accept the help of armed self-defense groups. See HILL,
supra note 31, at 18–19.
64. See id. at 21.
65. See, e.g., PAYNE, supra note 30, at 204.
66. Id. Rural blacks in Mississippi and throughout the South had long carried rifles for both
hunting and protection. Id.
67. HILL, supra note 31, at 2.
68. Id. Lance Hill has written one of the few histories of the Deacons to date, and his book,
The Deacons for Defense, is the most authoritative source on the group.
69. Id. at 4.
70. Id. at 2. Chapters were primarily in Louisiana, but many were also in Mississippi.
71. Id. at 4, 14–15.
72. Id. at 13.
73. Id. at 50.
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group’s size and capabilities.74 The membership was at its core only a small
number of men who attended all meetings and patrols. However, many other
men could be and were called upon when necessary.75
In 1965, Natchez was the first town to form a Deacons chapter in
Mississippi. The membership of the Natchez Deacons had the same
composition as most other Deacons chapters: a small secret group of
respectable, working-class family men.76 The chapter’s tasks primarily
consisted of armed patrols of the black community.77 The openly armed group
also provided escorts and guarded demonstrators. While the men were not
afraid to brandish their guns, they rarely had to fire a shot to accomplish their
goal of protection.78 In addition to involvement in their own communities,
Natchez Deacons were instrumental in setting up other chapters throughout the
state.79
With the help of organizations like the Deacons, by the late 1960s, racial
violence had lost its systematic nature in Mississippi, but still, violence
characterized the period.80 By 1968 the “most intensive and comprehensive
period of grass-roots organization and protest” in Mississippi was on the
wane.81 And yet, despite much progress, many areas of the state experienced
few of the changes that the civil rights movement had fought for and won. For
example, SNCC failed to establish a stronghold in Amite County in southwest
Mississippi—a county from which the organization had hoped to infiltrate
surrounding areas in Klan country, including Woodville. As a result, counties
like Wilkinson never experienced the influx of volunteers from national
organizations or were the subjects of a national litigation campaign or
publicized boycott. In towns like Woodville, the county seat of Wilkinson
County, civil rights activism was coordinated entirely by largely independent
local branches of the NAACP and Deacons for Defense.

74. Id. at 53.
75. Id. at 54.
76. Id. at 200.
77. Id. at 198.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 206. The chapter even provided protection to Martin Luther King, Jr. Id. To gather
funding for patrol cars and ammunition, Natchez Deacon James Stokes went so far as to undertake a
fundraising tour through the California cities of Los Angeles, San Mateo, Redwood City, San
Francisco, and Oakland. Id. at 204. Later, “Reverend” Stokes would help form the Woodville chapter
of the Deacons with forty Wilkinson County men. Id. at 210. He would also be actively involved in
obtaining a third party confession for Chambers’s defense.
80. See DITTMER, supra note 31, at 426; see also WENDT, supra note 31, at 149.
81. DITTMER, supra note 31, at 423.
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FIGURE 1: Wilkinson County Museum, Woodville, Mississippi (2011)

FIGURE 2: Wilkinson County African American Museum,
Woodville, Mississippi (2011)

B. Woodville, Mississippi
The Wilkinson County Museum, a small but prominent building on the
town square in Woodville, Mississippi, preserves the history of the area.82 That
history provides context for understanding the deeply embedded discrimination
against which blacks in Woodville fought in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, the
town’s pride is rooted less in its early settlers who were members of the 1817
Constitutional Convention,83 and more in its links to the Confederacy. On the
82.
83.

The Wilkinson County African American Museum was nonoperational in March 2011.
MISS. EMP’T SEC. COMM’N, SMALLER COMMUNITIES PROGRAM: WILKINSON COUNTY,
MISSISSIPPI, PART I ECONOMIC BASE REPORT 7 (1965).

2013]

LAW AND LOCAL ACTIVISM

459

courthouse lawn across from the museum sits the Jefferson Davis Oak—a
“living monument” to the Confederate president.84 A quick drive from the town
square down a country road sits Rosemont Plantation, Davis’s childhood home.
To this day, guided tours of the home refer to Davis as an American president.
During the civil rights movement, community leaders used the
community’s pride in its Confederate history as a tool of social oppression. For
example, a renewed interest in the area’s antebellum history took hold in the
1960s and early 1970s, kicked off by the county’s celebration of the Civil War
Centennial in 1962.85 Further, in the early 1970s, the Woodville Civic Club
revived the Depression-era tradition of “Pilgrimage,” a festival celebrating
antebellum life with tours of plantation homes guided by men and women in
period dress.86
Woodville’s antebellum past is linked with a town thirty minutes north on
the Mississippi River: Natchez. Woodville residents have long depended on
Natchez for its access to the river, jobs, and commercial goods. Wilkinson
County plantation owners also depended on Natchez for its slaves.87 In fact,
Natchez was home to the second largest slave trading post in the nation; the
fact that the area’s residents profited generously from both the slave trade and
slave labor is reflected in the extravagant homes on show during Pilgrimage.88
Natchez’s antebellum elite held prominent and influential positions throughout

84. BUS. & PROF’L WOMEN’S CLUB OF WOODVILLE, WELCOME TO WOODVILLE,
MISSISSIPPI: THE HOME OF YEAR ‘ROUND HOSPITALITY (n.d., c. 1960) (available at University of
Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, Eastland Collection, copy on file with author).
85. See, e.g., HISTORICAL COMM. OF THE WILKINSON CNTY. CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL
COMMEMORATION, WILKINSON COUNTY: HISTORICAL FACTS AND LEGENDS PERTAINING TO THE
COUNTY AND ITS COMMUNITIES, INSTITUTIONS AND EARLY SETTLERS (1962) (available at
University of Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, Eastland Collection, copy on file with
author).
86. WOODVILLE CIVIC CLUB, WILKINSON COUNTY GUIDE AND MAP (n.d., c. 1976) (notes
from primary source on file with author). For information on the Pilgrimage tradition today, see
NATCHEZ PILGRIMAGE TOURS, http://www natchezpilgrimage.com (last visited Jan. 23, 2013).
87. Indeed, even passersby noted the slave wealth of the area. For example, Frederick Law
Olmsted, who would later plan Central Park in New York City, described the life of African
Americans in Wilkinson County in 1860. KATHARINE M. JONES, THE PLANTATION SOUTH 380–89
(1957). In his book, A Journey through the Back Country, Olmsted wrote that “[t]he slaves generally
of this district appear uncommonly well—doubtless, chiefly, because of the wealth of their owners has
enabled them to select the best from the yearly exportations.” Id. at 382. Olmsted made other
observations: most plantations in the area had hundreds of slaves with absentee owners living in New
Orleans. Id. at 382, 386. Plantation owner Dick Hardaway Eggleston recorded the daily tasks given to
his slaves at Learmont Plantation near Woodville. Id. at 245–55. In addition to picking cotton, hauling
rails, clearing land, and logging, Eggleston’s slaves made arbors in the yard for his family’s “frolics”
and otherwise beautified the plantation home. Id. at 245, 251.
88. Historical markers and educational panels mark the spot where the slave market once
stood. See Forks of the Road Historical Site, THE HISTORICAL MARKER DATABASE,
http://www hmdb.org/Marker.asp?Marker=41533 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013). Even today it remains
unlikely that a visitor at Pilgrimage will hear an honest description of what antebellum life in the South
entailed for African American slaves.
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the state as the city served as the heart of Mississippi’s plantation economy.89
In the context of this powerful history, celebrations of economic prosperity
based on slavery and a war to maintain that system served in part as a thinly
veiled message to blacks in Woodville about their status within the community.
FIGURE 3: Mammy’s Cupboard Restaurant (2011)

Originally opened in 1940, in Natchez, Mississippi, Mammy’s Cupboard Restaurant is still
fondly thought of as a piece of nostalgia. However, during the civil rights movement in
Natchez and surrounding areas, the restaurant likely stood as a not-so-veiled reminder of
blacks’ status in the community. Today, the diner still draws a crowd. A patron who opens
the door in Mammy’s dress, as seen in the photo above, is sure to meet a long line of
patrons waiting to eat in the dining room that occupies the inside of Mammy’s dress,
which is adorned with mammy figurines and pictures.

Despite a civil war, Reconstruction, and the passing of nearly one hundred
years, not much had changed in Wilkinson County by the mid-1960s. Proudly
announced in a local newspaper, an early 1980s Harvard study referred to
Woodville as the town most resembling the antebellum South.90 In the post–
World War II era, many local blacks remained at the mercy of white
landowners. Samuel Hardin—a lifelong Woodville resident, civil rights
activist, and Deacon for Defense member—recounted an example of such
dependence. Not unlike many southern blacks, Hardin’s family took a loan
from a white landowner with no written contract. When the landowner
89. Umoja, The Natchez Model, supra note 31, at 273.
90. Woodville Charming Town, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, Feb. 28, 1981, at 46 (notes from
primary source on file with author).
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demanded full payment on the loan a year before it was due and in a higher
than agreed upon sum, Hardin’s family farm was lost.91 Similarly, widespread
tenant farming that resembled slavery maintained a system of economic
dependence on white landowners.92 Again, Hardin remembers job prospects at
the time: “Whatever job they had for you to do, you had to do it at they price
and go along with it. That was it.”93 Woodville’s blacks remained dependent on
whites for economic security through agricultural and domestic labor.
Nevertheless, the town began to see the faint beginnings of civil rights
activity in the mid-1950s. In response to Brown, Wilkinson County built a
“separate but equal” school, as did many other school districts throughout the
South.94 This improved the quality of the existing segregated black schools
such that it could ostensibly stand scrutiny under a “separate but equal”
comparison to the white schools, although they were of course not equal in
resources. Yet gains like better school facilities and lights for football fields
may have come at the cost of sacrificing local activists. Sam O’Quinn was
murdered for returning to Woodville to investigate reports of “mysterious
killings” in the area.95 It was rumored that Principal Willis, head of the
separate-but-equal school, was able to gain more resources for the black school
by acting as an informant for whites who had O’Quinn killed.96
Other activists were likewise targeted for their involvement in civil rights
activities throughout the 1950s. Reverend Dupree and his family were run out
of Wilkinson County in the middle of the night as a result of the Reverend’s
involvement as a leader in the NAACP.97 Indeed, life for blacks in Woodville

91. Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, in Woodville, Miss. (n.d.).
92. See generally GOLUBOFF, supra note 39, at 144–47.
93. Interview with Sam Hardin in Woodville, Miss. (Mar. 21, 2011) (notes from primary
source on file with author). Little of the activity of the Woodville Deacons has been recorded, and
unfortunately few Deacons are in good health today. Even fewer are willing to discuss their
participation in the organization. Thus, I have relied on information provided by Mr. Hardin
throughout the paper. The information provided during the interview I conducted with him has been
corroborated by past interviews he has given to Plater Robinson and Akinyele Omowale Umoja (as
recorded in her articles). Other snippets of information have been corroborated by newspaper articles
published around the time of the incident, including pieces written by Jack Nelson and John
MacKenzie. See John P. MacKenzie, Confession Case Reverses Usual Roles, WASH. POST, Nov. 26,
1972, at A2; Jack Nelson, Supreme Court Rules Some Hearsay is OK, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1973, at
21.
94. ANNE MOODY, COMING OF AGE IN MISSISSIPPI 229 (Delta Trade Paperbacks 2004)
(1968).
95. Id. at 202–04. Moody writes of town knowledge that two black men were paid by whites
to kill O’Quinn.
96. Id. at 203–04.
97. See, e.g., id. at 294; Memorandum from Zach J. Van Landingham to File 2-110 (Dec. 14,
1959), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History,
SCRID No. 2-110-0-11-2-1-1).
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was cruelly oppressive, even as the town celebrated the one-hundred-year
anniversary of the Civil War.98
Accordingly, it may be no surprise that in the decade preceding the 1969
shootout that led to Chambers, racial tensions slowly increased in Woodville
and the surrounding area as the gap grew between national civil rights litigation
and legislation and local realities. The Klan’s strongest stranglehold was on
southwest Mississippi99—and Woodville was in the heart of it. Klan
publications of the period issued a call to arms: “The time to fight is near and
we either must fight as Americans or put on the Chains of Slavery under the
Communist Negro and Kike stooges.”100 In the context of Civil War
commemorations, the local Klan subverted the history of slavery to incite fears
that blacks in the civil rights movement would soon figuratively or literally
enslave whites in retaliation. Although disclaiming any endorsement of “mob
violence,” the Klan, headquartered thirty miles north in Natchez, also purported
that one of the top fifty reasons to join the organization was “[b]ecause it is the
most effective way to fight organized crime in a community.”101 Thus, while it
seemingly disclaimed the practice of lynching, the local Klan supported
extralegal actions to control groups in the community that they perceived as
criminal, including the NAACP. In fact, other Klan materials advocated the
abolishment of the NAACP, demanded the reversal of the Supreme Court’s
civil rights decisions, and expressed concerns about miscegenation and
protection of the Southern Woman.102
The Klan’s horrifying reign of terror, animated by goals of racial
extermination and destruction of the civil rights movement, was most intense
during the summer of 1964, though it continued through 1968. Klan
membership was widespread within law enforcement agencies. The most
prominent Woodville example, perhaps, is Burthell McGraw, a known member
of the local Klan and Woodville’s sheriff in the late 1960s.103 With this level of
control over town affairs, the white extremists made it impossible for national
organizations to even enter Wilkinson County. Anne Moody, a civil rights
98. See HISTORICAL COMM. OF THE WILKINSON CNTY. CIVIL WAR CENTENNIAL
COMMEMORATION, supra note 85.
99. HILL, supra note 31, at 5.
100. KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., K.K.K. BRINGS
REAL FACTS TO THE SURFACE (n.d.) (available at University of Mississippi, Archives and Special
Collections, copy on file with author).
101. R.E. DAVIS, SR., KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, FIFTY REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD
BE A MEMBER OF THE ORIGINAL KU KLUX KLAN (n.d., c. 1960) (available at University of
Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, copy on file with author).
102. KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN, UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, INC., THE PRINCIPLE
OF THE UNITED KLANS OF AMERICA, KNIGHTS OF THE KU KLUX KLAN (n.d., c. 1960) (available at
University of Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, copy on file with author).
103. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93; see also DITTMER, supra note 31, at 218.
When policemen were also nightriders, it is understandable that black communities demanded black
police officers be hired in the local police departments.
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activist from the county, but working elsewhere in the state, later recalled that
“[n]o organization was about to go to Wilkinson County. It was a little too
tough for any of them.”104 Even Moody herself feared for her own safety as
well as that of her family and did not return home to the county during the early
years of the movement.105
Both Moody and the civil rights organizations had good reason to stay out
of the Woodville area. In December 1963, local blacks Eli Jackson, Dennis
Jones, and Lula Mae Anderson were found dead in their car on the side of the
road. The victims were not known for civil rights activism—indeed few people
were in 1963. Town officials said the group had died from inhaling the carbon
monoxide in the car’s exhaust, but blacks who saw the bodies reported that
Eli’s neck had been broken and the other two had been shot.106 White
extremists had terrorized the local black community to such an extent that no
one would speak to FBI investigators about the murders.107 A month later,
Louis Allen was killed in Liberty, Mississippi, the night before he planned to
flee the city. He had spoken out against a state senator whom Allen had seen
murder an innocent farmhand.108 Then, in February 1964, a black man named
Clifton Walker was murdered in his car on Poor House Road just outside of
Woodville. Men fired buckshot at him from both sides.109 No one was ever
charged with any of the five murders. Some of the victims were murdered for
no apparent reason—several had no clear civil rights connections. The truth is
that whites could and would murder blacks with impunity: the point was that
there did not need to be a point.110
While five deaths in three months would not be repeated, murders
continued in the area throughout the decade. In June 1966, Natchez Klan
members murdered Ben Chester, who was never active in the civil rights
movement. The Klan targeted Chester in hopes of luring Martin Luther King to
the town for an assassination attempt. King never came to Natchez for
Chester’s memorial.111 A year later, Wharlest Jackson died when a car bomb
exploded as he drove home from work. He had just received a promotion to a
position traditionally offered only to whites.112 The deaths of these men
reinforce the observation that unprosecuted violence did not cease in the second

MOODY, supra note 94, at 301.
Id. at 323, 363.
Id. at 398–99.
See id.
DITTMER, supra note 31, at 215; see also Cold Case: The Murder of Louis Allen, 60
MINUTES (Apr. 7, 2011, 4:34 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/04/07/60minutes/main2005
1850.shtml?tag=contentMain;cbsCarousel.
109. MOODY, supra note 94, at 392–99; see also Clifton Walker Case, THE CIVIL RIGHTS
COLD CASE PROJECT, http://coldcases.org/cases/clifton-walker-case (last visited Jan. 24, 2013).
110. Cf. PAYNE, supra note 30, at 15.
111. Id. at 397.
112. Id.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
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half of the decade in rural Mississippi; indeed, violence continued to be a tool
to enforce economic and social hierarchies.113
Even apart from these instances of extreme violence, daily life in
Woodville was oppressive. In Moody’s memoir, she recalls her relative’s
description of the plight of blacks: “[T]he whites in Woodville and how they
had set things up ma[de] it almost impossible for the Negro men to earn a
living.”114 The frustration was clear: “If these damn white folks ain’t shootin’
niggers’ brains out they are starvin’ them to death. A nigger can’t make it no
way he try in this fuckin’ place.”115 Likewise, Hardin recalled a similar
frustration: “There was so much we couldn’t do out there on the streets. People
didn’t want you to come out there half clean, you know not see ya in nothing
decent.”116 Even subtle forms of subordination would have lasting effects: in
her seventies, Laura Hardin, Mr. Hardin’s wife, recalled the strong memories of
frustration resulting from being forced to enter through the back door of the
homes in which she worked.117 For blacks in Woodville, troubles persisted
through the early 1970s.118
In contrast to these memories, white town officials preserved a less
extreme, and perhaps filtered, yet no less true snapshot into life and social
hierarchy at the turn of the decade. The 1971 Woodville Planning Commission
Report reveals everything from the town’s demographics to the officials’ hopes
of bringing commerce and a strong workforce to the declining town.119 The
series of reports detail a town behind the times. The town’s decline was marked
by a 15 percent decrease in population. Still, the town’s population remained 70
percent black.120 Of the black population in Woodville, over 90 percent lived
outside of the city limits, which served as outer boundaries of nearly all public
services.121 Woodville’s sewage systems and water supplies were inadequate

113. Recently, national news media have covered the killing of James Anderson in Jackson,
Mississippi, suggesting that violence against blacks in Mississippi has not completely subsided, but has
changed in form. The complicated act of determining whether the murder was a hate crime reveals
continued complex race relations in the state (and nation) today. See, e.g., Kim Severson, Weighing
Race and Hate in a Mississippi Killing, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 23, 2011, at A1.
114. MOODY, supra note 94, at 226.
115. Id.
116. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
117. Id.
118. See id. For example, in 1971, Mr. and Mrs. Hardin began constructing their home on a
country road outside of Woodville. Several other black families moved to the area at that time as well.
The first house on the street was burned before construction was finished. Afterwards, Mr. Hardin and
his friends stood guard each night at one another’s build sites to ensure that building materials were not
stolen and that the partially completed construction was not burned down. Id.
119. WOODVILLE-WILKINSON CNTY. PLANNING COMM’N, THE PLAN FOR THE FUTURE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE WOODVILLE AREA OF WILKINSON COUNTY (1971) [hereinafter THE 1971
PLAN].
120. Id. at 8.
121. WILKINSON CNTY. PLANNING COMM’N, ZONING ORDINANCE FOR THE TOWN OF
WOODVILLE III:15, 17 (1970) (notes from primary source on file with author).
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for all citizens,122 but over one thousand poor blacks still had no indoor
plumbing. Most lived in dilapidated shacks on unpaved streets with outdoor
toilets and no heat.123 The Commission’s proposed solution to the town’s
physical decline was to tear down the dilapidated housing near the city limits
and rebuild elsewhere.124
This desire to beautify the city limits reflected the Commission’s desire to
attract commerce to the dying city. Aware of Woodville’s delayed shift from an
agrarian to an industrial economy and the resulting rampant unemployment, the
Report focused on potential employment opportunities.125 Many men would
continue to work in the timber industry, either logging or in mills.126 The
Commission saw great potential for African American women in domestic
labor and the service industry.127 However, even with such possibilities only
half of the approximately 6500 black adults were employed.128 The median
annual family income for all Woodville citizens, blacks and whites combined,
totaled about two-thirds of the Mississippi median and one-third of the national
median.129
Likewise, education in the area provided minimal prospects. The
Commission included veiled references to the community’s white children
fleeing public schools after integration in January 1970.130 Still, the
Commission proudly proclaimed that the Wilkinson County Training School
was “headed by one of the most renowned Negro educators and philosophers in
the State.”131 The Commission failed to add that he was also valued among
white officials for his willingness to compromise with them.
Throughout the civil rights movement, particularly in the 1950s, black
teachers had a reputation for being particularly accommodationist: their

For a similar example of discriminatory municipal services see Hawkins v. Town of Shaw, 437
F.2d 1286 (5th Cir. 1971), rev’g 303 F. Supp. 1162 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (finding 97–98 percent of
dwellings occupied by blacks lacked access to municipal sewers, paved roads, and street lights). For
contemporary summaries and critical examinations of the decision, see C. Ronald Ellington &
Lawrence F. Jones, Commentary, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw: The Court as City Manager, 5 GA. L.
REV. 734, 735–46 (1971); Lawrence P. Simon, Jr., Comment, Equal Protection in the Urban
Environment: The Right to Equal Municipal Services, 46 TUL. L. REV 496, 501–07 (1972); Clark
Waddoups, Comment, Hawkins v. Town of Shaw—Equal Protection and Municipal Services: A
Small Leap for Minorities but a Giant Leap for the Commentators, 1971 UTAH L. REV. 397.
122. THE 1971 PLAN, supra note 119, at 11.
123. See id. at 6.
124. See id. at 16.
125. Id. at 8.
126. MISS. EMP’T SEC. COMM’N, supra note 83, at 57.
127. Id. at 32.
128. See id. at 61 (referring to 1960 figures).
129. THE 1971 PLAN, supra note 119, at 9.
130. Id. at 20. The flight and associated decline in attendance necessitated the closure of one
school. The resulting teacher to pupil ratio in white schools varied between 17:1 and 20:1; in the black
schools the ratio ranged from 28:1 and 42:1. MISS. EMP’T SEC. COMM’N, supra note 83, 97.
131. MISS. EMP’T SEC. COMM’N, supra note 83, at 96.
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middle-class jobs were dependent on placating white school boards.132
Nonetheless, their willingness to compromise with white officials likely
resulted in a better-resourced black education system in Woodville, and
perhaps contributed to the area’s somewhat unusual history of black
education.133 Throughout the 1950s the Sovereignty Commission monitored a
series of complaints within the black community about various teachers and
superintendents, including Superintendent Anselm Finch.134 Although
Superintendent Finch was instrumental in creating Wilkinson County’s first
black high school in 1959, increasing education opportunities for black students
throughout the 1960s,135 Finch had a reputation for his accommodationist
stance.136 His own writing reveals a personal ideological conflict based on
pragmatic concerns and pressures felt by some black leaders. He spoke against
those who demonstrated in opposition to the black education system and spoke
in favor of collaborating with the white community to gain access to resources;
and yet other writings imply a strongly felt connection to the civil rights
movement.137 Nevertheless, a large rally held in 1966 in response to
educational concerns identified school administrators as part of the problem.138
Thus, although the Wilkinson County black public schools experienced great
gains throughout the 1960s that were unusual for Mississippi, the schools were
often objects of protest rather than sites of civil rights organization or
inspiration.
132. See, e.g., MOODY, supra note 94, at 203. But see BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 41 and the
text of infra note 330 for a more nuanced account of the pragmatic reasons educators were
“accommodationists.”
133. See MOODY, supra note 94, at 229–30. Anne Moody’s memoir implies that the same
issues of teachers who were opposed to civil rights activities were present in Wilkinson County
throughout the 1950s.
134. See, e.g., Letter from Wilkinson County Parents League to Gentleman (July 26, 1959),
available at http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History,
SCRID No. 2-110-0-4-1-1-1).
135. Anselm J. Finch, Wilkinson County and Negro Schools, in WILKINSON COUNTY SNAPS:
REVEALING THE OTHER SIDE OF MISSISSIPPI 14–15 (1960) (available at University of Mississippi,
Archives and Special Collections, copy on file with author).
136. See Letter from Wilkinson County Parents League to Gentleman, supra note 134.
137. See id.; Anselm J. Finch, Address at the Annual Session of Mississippi State Federation
of Colored Women’s Clubs: Changing with the Change (Oct. 29, 1965) (available at University of
Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, copy on file with author).
Still, the community would march on Finch’s behalf in 1967 as the sole black candidate for a
school administrative position. The march protested “the Negro teachers [at the black schools] who did
not favor Negroes running in the Democratic primaries.” Mississippi March by Negroes Halted, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 5, 1967, at 31 (quoting James Jolliff, Jr., president of the Wilkinson County branch of the
NAACP).
138. L.E. Cole, Jr., School Boycott and Civil Rights Activity, Natchez and Woodville, Miss.,
(Oct. 17, 1966) [hereinafter Cole, School Boycott and Civil Rights Activity] (unpublished
investigative report), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on
file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives &
History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-42-1-1-1).
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Likewise, voting rights were virtually nonexistent for African Americans.
Although 70 percent of the county’s nearly 13,000139 residents were black, only
300 black residents were registered to vote in 1966. By contrast, nearly 1700
whites were registered that year.140 In 1961 the county registrar reported to the
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission that no black resident had attempted
to register either that year or any year during his tenure, which had begun in the
late 1950s. In response, the Department of Justice filed suit in 1963 against
several Mississippi county registrars, including Wilkinson County’s, to gain
access to their voter registration records.141 Several Mississippi counties
attempted to exploit a loophole that enabled them to evade inspection by
federal agents.142 Although the county lost the suit, the county registrar
continued to report to the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission that it was
doing its best to evade the federal registrars and FBI investigators who
routinely inquired into registration numbers.143 Paradoxically, based on that
information, the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission observed in 1965
that blacks in Woodville could easily register if they so desired.144
By the late 1960s, however, apparently enough blacks were able to
register in Wilkinson County to elect the area’s first black officials. The
experience of James Jolliff, Jr., who was elected to the Wilkinson Board of
Supervisors in 1967, exemplified blacks’ success and difficulties in electoral
representation. In a pamphlet circulated to potential black candidates across the
South, Jolliff said that he wanted to run for the office because of the influential
administrative powers of the position.145 He divulged that “[y]ou have to more
or less run a racist campaign, in a way of speaking. You have to prove that you
have done a lot for [the black community]. You’ve got to say you’ve done
more to help Negroes than this white man has.”146 Yet the significance of his
win was evident: “For the first time since Reconstruction, a Negro would be a
139. The 1960 population was approximately 13,000 and the 1970 population was
approximately 11,000. U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 1970 CENSUS OF POPULATION AND HOUSING:
FINAL REPORT: MISSISSIPPI 26-12 tbl.3 (1971).
140. A.L. Hopkins, Investigation in Wilkinson, Amite, and Pike Counties (Mar. 4, 1966)
[hereinafter A.L. Hopkins, Investigation in Counties] (unpublished investigative report), available at
http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State
Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-040-1-1-1).
141. Kennedy v. Owen, 321 F.2d 116 (5th Cir. 1963).
142. Id.
143. A.L. Hopkins, Investigation in Counties, supra note 140.
144. A.L. Hopkins, Investigation in Wilkinson County in Order to Ascertain if There Were
Any Subversive Persons or Activities in That Area at This Time (Apr. 23, 1965), available at
http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State
Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-039-1-1-1).
145. JULIAN BOND, BLACK CANDIDATES: SOUTHERN CAMPAIGN EXPERIENCES 14 (1969)
(available at University of Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, copy on file with author).
146. Id.
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supervisor. This county has 8,000 Negroes and 2,000 whites, and a Negro has
never even been dog-catcher in this county.”147 The significance of his win is
punctuated by the white community’s avid pursuit of a felony conviction Jolliff
received in the course of his civil rights activism. The felony resulted in
Jolliff’s removal from office,148 although he was eventually reinstated as
Supervisor after the appeal and reversal of his conviction.149 Barriers to fair
elections continued even into the 1970s.150
Given this backdrop, it is no surprise that other local government
institutions provided no aid to the black community in Woodville. For instance,
Clay Tucker, founding member of the Woodville White Citizens’ Council and
ardent informant for the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission, occupied
the position of district attorney for years.151 Not only was the judicial system
filled with open racists, but law enforcement was likewise infiltrated.152 Traffic
tickets were frequently used as a method of harassment. Hardin remembered
decades later how awful an officer could make him feel by pulling him over.
Social customs required Hardin to avert his eyes while being berated by the
officer. When retelling the details of the event, Hardin paused to say, “I
couldn’t hurt him by looking at him, you know?”153 Even after Woodville
began to hire black police officers as concessions to boycott demands in the
late 1960s, those officers were limited in their capacity. Black police officers
were only permitted to arrest blacks, were not enabled to protect blacks from
147. Id.
148. Id. at 13; see also Memorandum from Erle Johnston, Jr., Dir., Miss. State Sovereignty
Comm’n, to File (Sept. 12, 1967), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/
index.php (on file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department
of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-73-1-1-1).
149. BOND, supra note 145, at 13.
150. In 1973, there were several reports of whites entering voting booths with blacks, and
refusing to count black votes while counting the votes of whites from neighboring towns. Eight
candidates filed grievances, but to no avail. Election Results Contested by Blacks, WOODVILLE
REPUBLICAN, Jan. 1, 1973 (notes from primary source on file with author).
151. Virgil Downing, NAACP Activity – Wilkinson County (Jan. 30, 1961) (unpublished
investigative report), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on
file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives &
History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-21-1-1-1).
White Citizens’ Councils formed in 1954 with the help of future Mississippi Supreme Court
Justice Tom P. Brady, who authored Black Monday—a pamphlet denigrating the Supreme Court’s
decision in Brown. YASUHIRO KATAGIRI, THE MISSISSIPPI STATE SOVEREIGNTY COMMISSION: CIVIL
RIGHTS AND STATES’ RIGHTS xxviii–xxx (2001); Judges: The Education of Tom Brady, TIME, Oct.
22, 1965, at 94, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,941426,00 html.
This “segregation watchdog agency” carried out its surveillance by collaborating with local
leaders of White Citizen’s Councils, town officials, private investigators, and black informants.
KATAGIRI, supra, at 6, 208. Today, the Commission’s records of this surveillance are one of the few
sources remaining to reconstruct the lost civil rights histories of rural Mississippi towns even though
the information contained in the records was both selectively gathered and biased in presentation.
152. See DITTMER, supra note 31, at 252 (The Justice Department had issued warnings to stay
clear of southwest Mississippi where “the police were the Klan”).
153. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
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white violence, and were largely hired for weekend duty when protests and
pickets were most frequent.154
In sum, African Americans in Woodville were systematically oppressed
through violence, economic reprisals, government institutions, and social
customs. Without the support of outside civil rights organizations, in the late
1960s Woodville’s black community turned to the nearby town of Natchez for
inspiration and support. Slowly, the community would make gains through a
series of boycotts of white merchants combined with guarded marches and the
organization of a self-defense group.
C. Woodville’s Boycotts
Civil rights activities did not fully emerge in Woodville until the second
half of the 1960s. There were a few signs of activity after World War II, but
overt action was simply too dangerous to both lives and livelihoods. But after
nearby Natchez began to achieve significant successes through boycotts,
protest, and open resistance, civil rights activity became viable in nearby areas
like Woodville. Leading up to the shooting in June 1969, Woodville had
experienced almost three years of sustained boycotts. As a result of successful
boycotts of white stores, white merchants were often on the brink of forced
closure. An organized self-defense group routinely patrolled the area to protect
the community from nightriders and guarded civil rights marchers and
picketers.
This Section explores the details of Woodville’s civil rights activity. It
first examines how the formation of the local movement was inspired and
supported by a successful movement in Natchez, Mississippi. Then, this
Section gathers evidence of the movement’s power and success. Finally, it
discusses Woodville’s battle with school desegregation that took place before
and after the shooting of Officer Liberty on June 14, 1969.

154.

See infra at 188–190 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 4: The water tower in Woodville, Mississippi (2011)

Woodville continues to be small town to this day. Its old water tower marks the edge of the
few remaining stores on main street, and is representative of the condition of the town:
small, rural, traditional.

1. The Formation of a Local Movement155
Charles Evers, brother to slain civil rights activist Medgar Evers, emerged
as a strong political, business, and civil rights leader in the mid-1960s.
Although he was active in the movement throughout the state, it was Evers’s
leadership in Natchez that resulted in a model of successful activism that would
be replicated throughout southwest Mississippi.156 The “Natchez Model”
combined economic boycotts with paramilitary activities to gain concessions
from the white power structure.157 This strategy worked well in places like
155. Here, I use the terms “local movement” and “social movement” to refer to the groups and
activities that became recognizable as an organized force in the Woodville community in the second
half of the 1960s. I recognize that there is a vast literature, particularly in the fields of sociology and
law and society, that debates what constitutes a social movement and examines the complexity of
defining the concept. See, e.g., Michael McCann, Introduction, in LAW AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS i,
xiii–xiv (Michael McCann ed., 2006). This Comment does not take part in that debate, focusing
instead on the specific actions the local community undertook with the goal of creating racial equality
and the intersections of those actions with legal institutions.
156. Umoja, The Natchez Model, supra note 31, at 287–91. In his book, Hill argues that the
Louisiana Deacons spread their model to Natchez after successfully organizing and winning
concessions in Jonesboro and Bogalusa, Louisiana; thus, credit should go to the Deacons for the model
that emerged with Charles Evers as leader in Natchez. See generally HILL, supra note 31.
157. Umoja, The Natchez Model, supra note 31, at 271–72.
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Woodville, where large African American populations could wield significant
economic power yet were prevented from utilizing that power due to Klan
terror and violence.158
The strategy first called for economic boycotts of white merchants—these
boycotts would characterize the local movement in the second half of the
1960s. Successful boycotts forced meaningful concessions to reasonable
demands; however, they also often brought local businesses to the threshold of
closure if not actual closure.159 However, to make such gains, demonstrations,
picket lines, and planning meetings needed to be protected from the real threat
of violent white supremacists. Further, for boycotts to force concessions, they
needed to be nearly 100 percent effective. This required enforcement of the
boycott within the black community. Natchez activists solved these problems
by utilizing two groups of armed men. The first group, the Natchez Deacons for
Defense, protected civil rights organizations, individual leaders, and the
community.160 The second group, an “enforcer” squad, punished those in the
black community who broke picket lines or otherwise broke the boycott. The
squad used threats, violent rhetoric, public shaming, and isolation, as well as
physical strength.161
When put into action, the tactics of Natchez activists proved enormously
successful. The Deacons’ ability to neutralize Klan terror and retaliate against
violent acts bolstered their negotiating power.162 Eventually, Natchez activists
gained concessions including the addition of six black police officers to the
local force, representation on the school board, and desegregation of municipal
facilities.163 Due to the success of the Natchez movement—unprecedented in
the Klan strongholds in the southwest—other communities turned to Evers and
the Deacons for inspiration, examples, and aid.164 In fact, the Natchez Deacons,
Evers, and Evers’s enforcer squad became directly involved in movement
activities in Wilkinson County.165
With the help of Natchez Deacon James Stokes, Wilkinson County
formed its own branch of the Deacons for Defense to protect and enforce the
158. Interview with Charles Evers, in Jackson, Miss. (Mar. 24, 2011) (notes from primary
source on file with author).
159. Umoja, The Natchez Model, supra note 31, at 286.
160. Id. at 275, 278.
161. Id. at 272, 284–85. Umoja suggests that there were two distinct groups of armed men
tasked with different duties, one for protection and the other for enforcement. She does note that the
local media and law enforcement officials thought that the Deacons performed both activities. Thus,
the circumstances in Woodville seemed to blur lines distinguishing one group’s duties from another’s.
Id. at 284–85.
Umoja also highlights the role of NAACP women played as boycott enforcers—physically
disciplining female domestic workers suspected of being informants. Id. at 285–86.
162. Id. at 282.
163. Id. at 286.
164. Id. at 287–91.
165. Id. at 287; see also Interview with Charles Evers, supra note 158.
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area’s civil rights activities.166 Natchez’s success provided both opportunity and
resources to Woodville activists. In his capacity as the state spokesman for the
Deacons, Reverend Stokes, as many called him, helped recruit around forty
members for the Wilkinson County Deacons branch in 1965.167 The men who
joined were members of the NAACP and fraternal organizations like the
Masons. All were engaged in civil rights activity. Bilbo Ferguson became the
chapter president, and Ed “Red” Caine became the spokesman. Like other
chapters across the South, the Wilkinson County Deacons maintained secret
membership rolls with strict admissions criteria. Some local activists—
including Sam Hardin, James Williams, Gable McDonald, and Albert Carter—
purposefully became publicly known members. Other male activists, like Leon
Chambers, may not have been official members but were active in the
movement and openly carried arms when protecting marchers or enforcing a
boycott.
The main goal of the Woodville-based group was self-defense. Hardin, an
open and active member of the Deacons as well as the NAACP, recalled the
group’s activities: with citizens’ band radios, the group patrolled black
neighborhoods as protection against Klan activity.168 The Wilkinson County
Deacons also guarded marches in Woodville and, according to Hardin,
enforced several boycotts.169 The Deacons’ enforcement largely consisted of
roughing up shoppers who slipped into the white-owned stores through the
back door, or sending strongly worded warnings about the importance of the
boycott to individual families suspected of breaking it.170
Still, the Wilkinson County Deacons certainly were not looking for a
fight, not least because much of the time the guns they toted were not filled
with ammunition.171 On a day-to-day basis the Deacons were able to make do
with empty guns because the sight of armed black men—mostly veterans—who
were disciplined and organized was enough to scare white supremacists.172
Klan members were happy to carry out violence when there were no
repercussions but were not willing to risk their own lives when it became
apparent that the community would fight back.173

166. Umoja, The Natchez Model, supra note 31, at 287; see also HILL, supra note 31, at 210.
167. HILL, supra note 31, at 210.
168. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
169. Id.; Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91.
170. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
171. Id.; see also Umoja, The Natchez Model, supra note 31, at 280 (“If White supremacists
knew the Deacons had a limited supply of ammunition, the Deacons’s efforts would have been
compromised.”).
172. Umoja, The Natchez Model, supra note 31, at 280.
173. See, e.g., TYSON, supra note 36, at 49–50. The intense fear of organized armed black men
resulted in routine traffic stops of Deacons and gun confiscation. Id. Hardin remembered that the
confiscation only occurred on one side of the battle, as whites appeared heavily armed: the “Klan had
all kinds of guns, yes indeed.” Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
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Whether or not the local branch of the NAACP had ever been fully
committed to nonviolence, Woodville NAACP members during this period
carried weapons at meetings. The Deacons for Defense would also stand guard
outside of the meeting location.174 Armed guards at NAACP meetings were
necessary because of incidents like the one that Mr. and Mrs. Hardin recalled
years later. In September 1966, an unfamiliar man showed up at an NAACP
meeting that Mr. and Mrs. Hardin attended with their children. Although Mr.
Hardin noticed the stranger, someone at the meeting vouched for him, and he
was permitted to enter. The stranger became upset about his car needing to be
moved away from the church for safety reasons, and then began shooting. Mrs.
Hardin lay down on the floor with her children as the shooting commenced
while Mr. Hardin and other men in attendance tried to stop the shooter. Seven
men were wounded that night, including the shooter and Hardin. Hardin
remembers that the stranger later claimed that a white man put him up to it.
Hardin figured that was probably the case since whites would often hire blacks
to do “sideways stuff”—to instigate black-on-black violence to “show you how
dirty you could be.”175 Moreover, black informants were common in Woodville
just as they were throughout the South: all Deacon and NAACP meetings—no
matter how secret or private—would become known to town officials.176
The shooting at the NAACP meeting was not isolated. In fact, the
Deacons had their own shooting incident not long after, when a young
hotheaded Deacon quarreled with Ed Caine, the branch’s spokesman. The
quarrel was intense, and the young Deacon shot and wounded Caine.177 Despite
strict screening of members admitted to the organization, the Deacons in
Wilkinson County and Natchez were known for their cavalier brandishing of
weapons.178 However, the Deacons may have deliberately constructed that
reputation to spark fear among local white supremacists. Most meetings for the
Deacons were no different than most meetings for the NAACP: armed but
nonviolent. Like the NAACP, the Deacons met regularly on weekends when
the men were not at work. Discussions would naturally focus on “how we were
supposed to get out there and watch for each other . . . watch out for the
enemy”; in other words, strategy and patrol coordination.179
Thus, when the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission first observed
boycott activity in Woodville in October 1966, the community was well on its
way to implementing a Natchez-like model. Like the Natchez community,
which rejected the strategy of provoking northern consciences and depending
on federal intervention, the Woodville community took direct action through
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93; see also HILL, supra note 31, at 212.
Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
Id.
HILL, supra note 31, at 212.
See id.
Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
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local organization, economic boycott, and direct force. The NAACP and the
Deacons provided a ready set of resources for mobilization and action. And, not
least importantly, the community also made reasonable demands that town
officials took seriously: a black police officer, two part-time deputy sheriffs,
black clerks and cashiers in white-owned stores, paved roads, desegregated
schools and courtrooms, jury participation, and one appointment to the
Planning Commission.180
2. “One Hundred Percent Effective”
By October 1966, Charles Evers, in conjunction with then local NAACP
president James Jolliff, was running a tight and strong boycott in Woodville.
FBI agents were in town to observe, and Woodville’s mayor was seen daily in
the streets cursing boycotters.181 But as the holidays approached in December,
the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission noticed black shoppers in the
boycotted stores.182 Consequently, the community increased boycott
enforcement with the desired effect.183 Sovereignty Commission reports noted
Woodville merchants’ complaints about the boycott being 100 percent
effective.184
Negotiations began on February 8, 1967, when four Deacons escorted
Sovereignty Commission officials to a Woodville church for a negotiation
meeting.185 One official present observed over fifty Deacons guarding the
church with carbines, rifles, and shotguns.186 Negotiations went well, and the

180. Letter from Frank E. Bell, Chairman, Comm. for the White Citizens of Wilkinson Cnty.
to the Comm. for the Negro Citizens of Wilkinson Cnty., Oct. 12, 1966 [hereinafter Letter from Frank
Bell], available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History,
SCRID No. 2-110-0-44-1-1-1).
181. Cole, School Boycott and Civil Rights Activity, supra note 138.
182. L.E. Cole, Jr., Boycott, Woodville, Mississippi (Oct. 28, 1966) [hereinafter Cole, Boycott,
Oct. 28, 1966] (unpublished investigative report), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/
digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files,
Mississippi Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-47-1-1-1); Cole, School Boycott
and Civil Rights Activity, supra note 138.
183. Hardin remembers the need to enforce the boycott, and having to calm down a friend who
became violently angry at the sight of his own father breaking the picket line. Interview with Sam
Hardin, supra note 93; see also L.E. Cole, Jr., Pike, Amite, Wilkinson and Adams Counties (Dec. 6,
1966) (unpublished investigative report), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/
sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi
Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-48-1-1-1) (observing that some blacks were
seen in whites stores as the holidays approached).
184. Cole, Boycott, Oct. 28, 1966, supra note 182.
185. L.E. Cole, Jr., Woodville, Mississippi (Feb. 13, 1967) (unpublished investigative report),
available at http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History,
SCRID No. 2-110-0-58-1-1-1).
186. Id.
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black community gained several concessions from the town, including jobs at
white-owned stores and two black police officers.187
Yet only a certain kind of black police officer would be tolerated on the
force. In March 1967, when a group of white youths argued over a car with a
group of black youths, Woodville police were called to the scene.188
Responding to the call was one of the newly appointed black officers. The
black officer was tasked with serving arrest warrants on the black youths.
However, when it became clear that only the group of black youths would be
arrested, the black officer refused to serve the warrants. White officers
promptly arrested the black youths, and the black officer was dismissed from
his post. Over 250 people rallied in protest of the officer’s dismissal.189 While
the Sovereignty Commission report detailing the events does not contain the
officer’s name, both an interview and a newspaper article corroborate that Leon
Chambers was the first black police officer in Woodville and that he resigned
after being asked to arrest only blacks.190
Despite the February concessions, another boycott was up and running in
August 1967.191 By September, the town sheriff, who had been known to walk
187. Letter from Frank Bell, supra note 180.
188. Lee Cole, Jr., Waynesboro and Woodville, Mississippi (Mar. 13, 1967) (unpublished
investigative report), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on
file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives &
History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-60-1-1-1).
189. Id.
190. MacKenzie, supra note 93; Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
191. See Memorandum from Lee Cole, Investigator, to Erle Johnston, Jr., Dir., Miss. State
Sovereignty Comm’n (Aug. 3, 1967), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/
sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi
Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-68-1-1-1). A similar incident occurred the
following month in September 1967.
Often members of the civil rights community in Natchez or other nearby towns would join the
marches in support. Likewise, white supremacists from nearby towns would gather in support of
Woodville’s white opposition. It was not uncommon for white supremacists to stand on buildings with
guns trained on the marchers. Consequently, Deacons patrolled the edges of the march openly armed
for protection. Nevertheless, during one August march, a group of forty armed white men gathered in a
line confronting the marchers, who in turn disbanded and returned home rather than risk a bloody
confrontation. Although reports are conflicting, the event drew national attention. Between five
hundred and one thousand marchers were stopped during a march in Woodville by town police, armed
whites, and sixty highway patrolmen. Mississippi March by Negroes Halted, supra note 137; Lee
Cole, Wilkinson County - Woodville, Mississippi (Sept. 11, 1967) (unpublished investigative report),
available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History,
SCRID No. 2-110-0-70-1-1-1).
Throughout the day Deacons were stopped and disarmed while the armed white civilians were
permitted to keep their guns. Mississippi March by Negroes Halted, supra note 137. A different
account reports that over two hundred marchers were threatened in Centreville, also in Wilkinson
County. According to this report, a white man approached the crowed with a rifle and threatened the
marchers. In response, over twenty-five Woodville Deacons who were present revealed their guns to
diffuse the situation. Umoja, The Natchez Model, supra note 31, at 280–81; HILL, supra note 31, at
211; WENDT, supra note 31, at 149–50.
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with protestors, had a nervous breakdown.192 In the ensuing election, Klansman
Burthell McGraw became Woodville’s new sheriff.193 Under his direction, the
week after the tense protests, Mississippi state highway patrolmen were called
to Wilkinson County. The patrolmen issued over three hundred traffic tickets
and arrested numerous blacks in Woodville for a variety of violations.194 Town
officials were overwhelmingly pleased with the Highway Patrol’s efforts: a
town official reported to the Sovereignty Commission that this was the first
time anyone had ever come to town and made “them” behave.195
Also during September 1967, several Deacons were jailed ostensibly so
that law enforcement could press upon them the importance of lifting the
boycott.196 Unrest and harassment continued throughout the month. For
example, the town responded to complaints about unfair primary elections by
setting curfews on beer sales in an attempt to lower the number of blacks in
town over the weekend.197 The town also sought advice on how to sue the
NAACP to end the boycott since, as officials understood the situation, the black
community was implementing a painful third-party boycott without
demands.198
More of the same continued through October 1967. The boycott was at
100 percent again, as were the accompanying Friday night rallies and harsh
highway patrol enforcement of traffic laws.199 FBI agents were posted in town
to monitor the boycotts and protests, but whether they were there to observe the
town officials or the activists is unclear.200 October also brought two
noteworthy incidents. The first happened on the fifteenth when a man drove his
car into a crowd of marchers, “bruising” a twelve-year-old child.201 The
Sovereignty Commission’s report expressed skepticism of the mother’s
assertion that the injuries were serious.202 Then, toward the end of the month,
Mr. Hudgins, a white man, shot two young black boys with buckshot.203 The
boys had been out in a nearby field shooting guns at targets for fun. While the
192. Cole, Wilkinson County – Woodville, Mississippi, supra note 191.
193. Id.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See id.
197. See id.; Lee Cole, Activity in Wilkinson & Pike Counties (Sept. 19, 1967) (unpublished
investigative report), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on
file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives &
History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-74-1-1-1).
198. Memorandum from Lee Cole, Investigator, to Erle Johnston, Jr., Dir., Miss. State
Sovereignty Comm’n (Sept, 29, 1967), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/
sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi
Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-75-1-1-1).
199. Cole, School Boycott and Civil Rights Activity, supra note 138.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Cole, Activity in Wilkinson & Pike Counties, supra note 197.
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boys were accused of stealing the guns they used, law enforcement took no
action against Hudgins. However, Woodville’s black community did take
action: Hudgins’ business was burned down and his home was fired into.204
Soon afterward Hudgins reported to the Sovereignty Commission that he
thought these events might be in retaliation for shooting the boys.205
Although no major incident occurred, between November 1967 and
January 1968 Woodville’s boycott remained 100 percent effective. White
merchants were “begging” for help.206 Yet, by April 1968, the boycott’s scope
was severely lessened, and the Sovereignty Commission heard of no reports of
Deacon activity.207 Ostensibly, many of the goals of the boycott had been
accomplished.
When examining the Sovereignty Commission reports, it is possible to see
the events that took place in Woodville between 1966 and 1968 as one long
boycott that waxed and waned. But, community members thought of the events
as several smaller boycotts, each with individual grievances, goals, and
gains.208 During this period, NAACP membership expanded significantly, 209
and several demands were met, including an expansion of job opportunities in
white stores. Importantly, the civil rights activity also resulted in more frequent
use of courtesy titles. No longer was Hardin referred to as “boy” or “son.”210
Nevertheless, the town continued to replace black police officers for alleged
insubordination and resignation, and certain demands such as paved streets
were never addressed.
Despite its willingness to make economic and political concessions, the
white community in Woodville was adamantly against coeducational
desegregated schools. Segregated schools persisted in 1969, and issues of
school resources, staffing, and integration plans were all contested. Concerns
over miscegenation persisted throughout the South despite—or possibly
because of—the Supreme Court’s 1967 decision in Loving v. Virginia.211
204. L.E. Cole, Jr., Woodville, Mississippi (Oct. 27, 1967) (unpublished investigative report),
available at http://mdah.state.ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the
Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History,
SCRID No. 2-110-0-76-1-1-1).
205. See id.
206. L.E. Cole, Jr., Wilkinson County (Woodville, Gloster, Centerville) (Jan. 23, 1968)
(unpublished investigative report), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/
index.php (on file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department
of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-81-1-1-1).
207. Memorandum from L.E. Cole, Jr., Investigator, to File (May 1, 1968), available at
http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State
Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-084-1-1-1) (subject: General Report – Southern District).
208. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
209. DITTMER, supra note 31, at 390.
210. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
211. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (holding Virginia’s antimiscegenation law
unconstitutional). In June 1969, The Citizen, a publication of the White Citizens’ Councils, published
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3. School Desegregation
Having achieved considerable gains in voting rights and economic
opportunities, Woodville’s black community began a new boycott for
desegregated schools in the summer of 1969, after the federal government had
finally intervened in Woodville to enforce Brown. The Department of Health,
Education, and Welfare (HEW) created a plan for integrating Wilkinson
County schools. The plan was promptly published and denounced in the town’s
weekly paper, the Woodville Republican.212 HEW’s plan was simple: split up
the four existing school buildings into two high schools and two elementary
schools—all integrated and coeducational.213 In response, the town proposed a
simple plan that evaded full integration: split up the schools into two high
schools and two elementary schools—integrated by race but segregated by
sex.214
During the summer of 1969, as HEW made it clear to the white
community that school integration was in the immediate future, Woodville’s
black community filed a new set of grievances with town officials over teacher
firings and school resources.215 This time, two of the town’s civil rights
leaders—Mon Cree Allen and James Jolliff—led the organizing efforts.216

several articles concerning looming integration of schools and the possibility of miscegenation. See,
e.g., Medford Evans, Sex Education in Integrated Schools, CITIZEN, June 1969, at 12 (available at
University of Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections).
212. Lewis, Localisms, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, July 11, 1969, at 1; School Board Rejects
HEW Plan, Court to Make Ruling, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Aug. 15, 1969, at 1; Dual County
School System to End Dec. 31, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Nov. 14, 1969, at 1; Wilkinson Co. Ordered
to Adopt HEW Pairing Plan, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Dec. 26, 1969.
213. Dual County School System to End Dec. 31, supra note 212, at 1.
214. School Board Rejects HEW Plan, Court to Make Ruling, supra note 212, at 1.
215. Letter from The Negro Community to Whom It May Concern (June 11, 1969), available
at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State
Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-085-1-1-1). The principals and staff at Woodville’s black schools, like in most areas in the South, were
largely accommodationist. MOODY, supra note 94, at 229, 382.
216. Letter from Bernard Waites, Superintendent of Educ., Wilkinson Cnty., to W. Webb
Burke, Dir., State Sovereignty Comm’n of Miss. (Oct. 10, 1969), available at http://www mdah.state.
ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/images/png/cd05/03727
8.png&otherstuff=2|110|0|89|1|1|1|36692 (on file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission
Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-89-1-1-1).
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While a new boycott was put in effect for the summer,217 it remained unclear
which integration plan would win out.218
The new boycott’s power to desegregate during the summer of 1969 is
revealed in a series of letters sent from a Miss Mabel D. Bocking, an older
white Wilkinson County resident, to her U.S. Senator, James Eastland.219 Her
first three letters, dated July 2, 5, and 6, 1969, reflect how some in the area—
presumably the most ardent white supremacists—were affected by civil rights
desegregation activity and the small gains that African Americans had
accomplished.220 Much of the letters’ contents focus on the Woodville and
Wilkinson County 1969 boycotts and the “watchers” who enforced them within
the black community:
If a negro goes in a white place of business . . . the negro street
watchers will beat him and burn his home. They are forcing all
negroes, against their will, to buy their merchandise from . . . negro
merchants . . . [or from places that] employ negro cashiers, who have a
first grade elementary education and are on the welfare, and draw other
government checks, and have a new car or 5 each, and draw more
salary than you do.221
Miss Bocking also wrote about the road blockades that seemingly resulted from
marches and protests. She told Senator Eastland about how she was forced to
drive her car carefully up and shove the cars out of her way, the whole time
cursing “like thunder.”222 The cursing, according to Miss Bocking, made
“them” scared enough to drop the guns that were pulled on her.223
Miss Bocking’s letters are damning and unrestrained accounts of life in
Wilkinson County at the turn of the decade. The letters ramble on for pages,
circling back to the same few themes: demands to repeal all civil rights laws
217. In August the Sovereignty Commission received reports about intimidation and harsh
enforcement of the boycott within the black community. Letter from W. Webb Burke, Dir., Miss. State
Sovereignty Comm’n, to Richard Watson, Attorney at Law (Aug. 28, 1969), available at
http://www mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/data/sov_commission/i
mages/png/cd05/037274 png&otherstuff=2|110|0|88|1|1|1|36688 (on file with the Mississippi State
Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-088-1-1-1).
218. See Lewis, supra note 212, at 1; School Board Rejects HEW Plan, Court to Make Ruling,
supra note 212, at 1; Dual County School System to End Dec. 31, supra note 212, at 1; Wilkinson Co.
Ordered to Adopt HEW Pairing Plan, supra note 212.
219. Letters from Miss Mabel D. Bocking to James Eastland, U.S. Sen. (July 2, 1969; July 5,
1969; July 6, 1969; Aug. 14, 1969; Dec. 20, 1969; Jan. 18, 1970) (available at University of
Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, Eastland Collection, copy on file with author).
220. Although Miss Bocking’s letters may represent the most extreme view in Woodville’s
white supremacist community, her letters nevertheless reveal the sentiments of those who, like Miss
Bocking, interacted often with black protestors.
221. Letter from Miss Mabel Dorothy Bocking to Jim Eastland, U.S. Sen. (July 5, 1969)
(available at University of Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, Eastland Collection, copy on
file with author).
222. Id.
223. Id.
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and reinstate segregation,224 explanations of anticommunist conspiracy
theories, pleas for aid to desperate whites in Wilkinson County, and common
white supremacist topics including states rights, miscegenation, and biblically
commanded white rule.225
Miss Bocking’s rambling letters also reveal that she herself was one of the
white merchants severely hurt as a result of the 1969 desegregation boycotts:
We here in Wilkinson County, Miss have been boycotted by the negro,
and these negroes are most sassy, and wicked, and wild, and like
cannibals here . . . . The law officers are afraid to get rough with them,
but they must, but without the use of guns only occasionally. The
white people here are suffering torture and are hungry. The business
people, like myself here, are catching ‘hell;’ pardon my language. . . .
Stop allowing these negro watchers to beat a negro if he goes in a
white . . . store. Stop letting them set fires to peoples places and stop
letting them threaten white merchants and threatening to burn white
peoples homes. They threw bricks through one man’s car here. They
(negroes) make all negroes trade in Wilkinson County with
negroes . . . when the negroes want to come to the rest of us white
merchants in Wilkinson County where they are used to coming. Stop,
stop, please, this mess. See to it police put a stop to this negro policy to
spite the Wilkinson County merchants.226
As a poor white merchant,227 Miss Bocking blamed all of her troubles on blacks
that were no longer “in their place.”228 She felt her own place as a white
southern woman was at risk when she heard herself referred to as “white trash”
and “crookeder than a barrel of snakes.”229 Miss Bocking’s letters are just one
example of how poor whites in Wilkinson County reacted to the tensions that
civil rights activity brought to the surface, particularly activism related to
school desegregation.

224. For example, she had utmost contempt for black voting rights and the resulting recent
election of Mississippi’s first black mayor, Charles Evers, in nearby Fayette. In a December 1969
letter, Miss Bocking made dire predictions about the future election of a negro president, opining,
“[T]hings will become so terrible on earth that they close the book of the Lord here.” Letter from Miss
Mabel D. Bocking to James O. Eastland, U.S. Sen. (Dec. 20, 1969) (available at University of
Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, Eastland Collection, copy on file with author).
225. One of her first letters read, “[A]ll of you in Congress need your heads examined for
letting the negro run over the white race. No negro is hungry or really suffering in this U.S.A. so do not
let him lie to you and tell you he is.” Letter from Miss Mabel D. Bocking to Jim Eastland, U.S. Sen.
(July 2, 1969) (available at University of Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, Eastland
Collection, copy on file with author).
226. Id.
227. Letter from Miss Mabel Dorothy Bocking to Jim Eastland, supra note 221.
228. She mentions in one letter that after telling the police of her FBI conspiracy theory, they
wanted to check her into a mental institution. Letter from Miss Mabel D. Bocking to James O.
Eastland, U.S. Sen. (July 6, 1969) (available at University of Mississippi, Archives and Special
Collections, Eastland Collection, copy on file with author).
229. Letter from Miss Mabel Dorothy Bocking to Jim Eastland, supra note 221.
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However, neither Miss Bocking’s letters nor other local opposition to
desegregation could stop the federal government’s intervention in Woodville.
Eventually, a U.S. district court concluded that HEW’s school integration plan
would be enacted in January of 1970.230 Although the town could not change
that decision, it could and did labor quickly to find a workaround. Over the
Christmas break of the 1969–1970 school year, the Woodville White Citizens’
Council hurriedly set up all-white private schools. This drew New York Times
coverage of the opening of Wilkinson County public schools in January
1970.231 The nation’s eyes were directed toward Mississippi and how its small
rural towns would react to forced integration. Remarkably, although many
Mississippi school districts responded simultaneously to the federal
government’s integration plan by setting up alternative white private schools,
only Wilkinson County public schools actually opened with virtually no white
children.232 Both black and white children and their parents were confused by
the presence of two white children who attended a public elementary school on
the first day. The white older sister told reporters that she had been scared, and
the black children also reported being nervous about sitting next to the white
girl in class.233 While in other areas of Mississippi a minority of white children
continued attending, after the second day of classes in Woodville, not a single
white student attended the county’s public schools. The siblings that attended
that first day were pulled by their family after the community provided both
pressure and the gift of scholarships to the Citizens’ Council schools.234
In the months that followed, Charles Evers again organized Woodville’s
black community in conjunction with surrounding counties in a selective
buying campaign.235 The community was acutely aware that buying from
whites funded private white education. The slogan of this boycott proclaimed
that if blacks were not good enough to go to school with whites, blacks would
not spend money with them either.236 This boycott, like those previous, had an
acute effect on Miss Bocking. Her last December 1969 and January 1970 letters
230. Dual County School System to End Dec. 31, supra note 212, at 1.
231. James T. Wooten, 2 Whites and 1,391 Blacks in a Mississippi School, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6,
1970, at 1.
232. Id.; see also JASON SOKOL, THERE GOES MY EVERYTHING: WHITE SOUTHERNERS IN
THE AGE OF CIVIL RIGHTS, 1945–1975, at 172–73 (2006).
233. SOKOL, supra note 232, at 172–73.
234. Id. To this day, schooling in Wilkinson County continues to be segregated in the same
manner, with a majority of the black students attending public schools and white students attending
private schools. Cf. Celnisha L. Dangerfield, Mapping Race, School Segregation, and Black Identities
in Woodville, Mississippi: A Case Study of a Rural Community, 4 J. RURAL CMTY. PSYCHOL. *1
(2001), available at http://www marshall.edu/jrcp/dangerfieldSI htm (exploring how separation within
the Woodville educational system impacts identity formation, a process reinforced by the local mass
media). In fact, not until 1989 did the Wilkinson County school district cease annual decreases in
public school funding. Marilee C. Rist, Doing More with Less in Mississippi, 13 EXEC. EDUCATOR 37,
38 (1991).
235. Thomas A. Johnson, Mississippi Faces Negroes’ Boycott, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9, 1970, at 1.
236. Id.
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convey continuing concern about desegregated schools and a boycott that was
forcing whites to close shop and leave the area. Her January letter, addressed
not only to Senator Eastland but also to President Nixon, immediately
confronted the issue of education.237 Not only should public schools be
segregated, but also African Americans’ education should be limited to that
which is necessary “as the servant of the white race as demanded in the
Bible.”238 Miss Bocking’s letters further reveal that, like many white
supremacists, her outrage at school desegregation was intimately linked to her
concerns about miscegenation and rape.239
It was within this environment that Aaron Liberty died and Leon
Chambers was accused of his murder. Although tensions in Woodville had
been running high for some time due to boycott demands, previous years’
demands had largely focused on economic changes like access to jobs. Now,
many in Woodville’s black community demanded not only good schools but
also integrated coeducational schools. Integrated schools posed a new set of
problems for many whites. Whites’ concerns over miscegenation were severe,
and the possibility of interracial couples resulting from integrated schools could
not be tolerated. Moreover, the school desegregation debate involved the
federal government’s intervention in what the white community perceived as
states’ rights.
The June 1969 shootout that left Leon Chambers severely injured and
Aaron Liberty dead drastically increased the boycott’s importance.240 In this
context, the shooting of Liberty, a black police officer, meant different things to
the black and white communities. To the whites in power, it posed a threat of
increased protests and boycotts, and it served as an example of a reckless and
out-of-control black population. To the black community, the incident was an
example of police brutality and recklessness—as well as the manipulation of a
black police officer to act against those who forced the town to hire a black
police officer in the first place.
II.
CHAMBERS V. MISSISSIPPI: A MORE COMPLETE ACCOUNT
There are as many accounts of what happened the night Aaron Liberty
died as there are people to tell them. Some accounts are public constructions in
237. Letter from Miss Mabel D. Bocking to James O. Eastland, U.S. Sen. (Jan. 18, 1970)
(available at University of Mississippi, Archives and Special Collections, Eastland Collection, copy on
file with author).
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Memorandum from W. Webb Burke, Dir., Miss. State Sovereignty Comm’n, to File (July
9, 1969), available at http://www mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/result.php?image=/
data/sov_commission/images/png/cd05/037256.png&otherstuff=2|110|0|86|1|1|1|36670 (on file with
the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History,
SCRID No. 2-110-0-86-1-1-1, Mississippi Department of Archives & History).
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hopes of influencing memories of the event. Others are given under oath. And a
few provide glimpses into hidden civil rights activity—a world where ends
justify means. When woven together, the accounts provide a textured
illumination of one small incident in the civil rights movement that would
become the impetus for a landmark holding by the United States Supreme
Court.
A. June 14, 1969
On a hot Saturday afternoon in Woodville, Mississippi, a black youth in
his twenties named C.C. Jackson was playing the jukebox in Hayes’s Cafe.241
Several times, he reported to the bartender that the jukebox took his dimes
without playing a song, and asked for reimbursement.242 Eventually, Clarence
Hayes, owner of the bar and pool hall, caught on to Jackson’s scheme; Jackson
was the only person all day who had had troubles with the machine.243 Tired of
Jackson’s scam, Hayes warned Jackson to stop disrupting the bar, but Jackson
refused to stop. Consequently, Hayes filed an affidavit with the Woodville
Police Department for Jackson’s arrest later that afternoon.244 However, despite
great efforts, Jackson was not arrested on Saturday, June 14, 1969.245
There is no indication that June 14 was any different from any other
Saturday in Woodville that summer. The boycott was still in effect; yet there
are no reports of marches that weekend. Like most weekends during a boycott,
there were probably a few picketers outside white merchants’ stores and
boycott enforcers around town. As the day came to a close and evening sank in,
the town almost certainly looked like most small southern towns on a Saturday
night.246 Most of the black community would come to town to socialize.247 In
her memoir, Anne Moody writes of Saturday nights in Wilkinson County and
elsewhere in Mississippi: “Those that didn’t believe in sitting around or
241. Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91; Interview with Sam
Hardin, supra note 93.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93; Transcript of Trial Record, at fols. 156–57, in
Combined Court Records, State v. Chambers, 252 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1971) (No. 46378) (notes from
primary source on file with author).
245. See Town Policeman Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, June
20, 1969, at 1. C.C. Jackson would reappear in the town’s newspaper and in court just a few years
later. The two-time jail escapee’s escapades were dubbed the “Saga of C.C.” and a “one man crime
wave” by the town’s newspaper. Eventually Lenox Forman, by then a judge, sentenced C.C. to serve
several years at Parchman Penitentiary. Arrest Local Man on Election Night Assault Charges,
WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Aug. 13, 1971, at 1; C.C. Jackson Shot and Captured Here Sunday,
WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Feb. 25, 1972, at 1; Grand Jury Returns 12 Bills; Jolliff Indicted on 2
Counts, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Mar. 17, 1972, at 1; Jackson Escapes Jail Saturday, WOODVILLE
REPUBLICAN, Oct. 15, 1971, at 1; Jury Trial Nets Guilty Verdict, 7-year Pen Term, WOODVILLE
REPUBLICAN, Mar. 26, 1971, at 1.
246. See MOODY, supra note 94, at 319.
247. Id. at 318–19.
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hanging out in bars . . . just sat or moved from car to car for four or five
hours.”248 It was a time when people could come to town, catch up, and relax.
If the town’s last movie theater, The Joy, had not been closed to avoid
desegregating the theater, the kids too young to go to bars would have gone to a
movie.249 Sometimes there would be a fight, but always there would be white
police officers patrolling the town square.250
By evening, as the town square began to fill up, two officers had begun to
execute the arrest warrant for Jackson. Officers Forman and Liberty were
assigned to the task. Both had been on the town’s police force for about a year
and a half.251 James Forman was a white, full-time officer.252 He was known in
the black community as “Fussie.”253 Aaron Liberty was a black, part-time
officer.254 At age fifty-seven, Liberty was tall and weighed over three hundred
pounds.255 He had a wife and son as well as a large extended family in the
area.256 Liberty worked during the week at a wholesale grocery and helped out
the police department on weekends.257 Reportedly well respected by powerful
whites in the community, those who knew him called him “Son” or “Sonny.”258
The black community knew Liberty as “one of those hired men the white folks
had to keep the black folks straight.”259
The two officers had already stopped by Hayes’s Cafe on foot but were
unable to locate Jackson. Now nearly night out, Officers Forman and Liberty
made rounds in a patrol car. The two officers stopped at each black bar in town
before returning to Hayes’s Cafe around nine o’clock.260 In his testimony at
trial, Forman recalled seeing Jackson at that time outside the bar “with about
thirty more colored people, colored males” out in the street.261 The officers
parked the car and walked toward the crowd.262 According to Forman, he told
Jackson he was under arrest and to get into the police car.263 In response to this
request, Forman reported that Jackson yelled, “you’ll have to kill me first[!]”264
Id. at 319.
See id.
Id.
Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 171.
Id. at fols. 154–56.
Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91, at 13.
Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 171; Lewis, Localisms, WOODVILLE
REPUBLICAN, June 20, 1969 (notes from primary source on file with author).
255. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 152.
256. See Town Policeman Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, supra note 245.
257. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 171.
258. Lewis, supra note 254.
259. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
260. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 144, 157; see also Town Policeman
Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, supra note 245.
261. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 157.
262. Id. at fol. 158.
263. Town Policeman Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, supra note 245.
264. Id.; Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 158.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.
253.
254.
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In return, Forman remembered simply trying to handcuff Jackson, but Sam
Hardin recounted that Forman “wanted to whup [Jackson], and still take him to
jail. . . . [H]e couldn’t arrest the boy without beating him.”265
In fact, Forman was unable to complete his attempt to arrest Jackson
because several men in the crowd interfered. To Forman, it felt like twenty or
twenty-five men jumped him, James Williams included.266 Indeed, Forman
testified that he specifically remembered throwing Williams off his back.267
There is no doubt that Williams was outside Hayes’s that evening. As a local
civil rights leader and a Deacon for Defense, Williams was no stranger to
confrontation with the Woodville police.268
But while Williams was well respected within the civil rights community,
the same could probably not be said for Jackson. He was a troublemaker, and it
is clear that the black men outside Hayes’s Cafe that night were not upset about
the warrant for his arrest. However, the crowd of men, which included several
civil rights activists, were upset that the white officers wanted to beat Jackson
before handcuffing him and taking him to jail.269
During this first arrest attempt, no account places Liberty near the crowd.
In fact, after being repelled by the crowd, Forman gave up on the arrest
temporarily and returned to the patrol car to call for back up. He radioed three
white deputy sheriffs: Bud Geter, Waldo Welch, and Herman Anthony.270
While he waited for them to arrive, Forman returned to the crowd. Forman
testified that he “didn’t try anything, [he] just talked to” Jackson to try to
persuade him to get into the patrol car.271
Yet, Officer Welch admitted that as he arrived he saw Forman grab
Jackson, put him on the ground, and place one cuff on him.272 While Welch
aided this second arrest attempt, both Forman and Geter heard James Williams
lead the crowd in chants of “kill ’em, kill ’em[!]” and “kill them son of a
bitches.”273 In one of Gable McDonald’s accounts of the evening, he
remembered that the white officers were handling Jackson so roughly that the
men in the crowd went to assist him.274 The officers agreed with just part of

265. Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91, at 14.
266. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 158.
267. Id. at fol. 159.
268. Jack Nelson, Supreme Court to Rule on Mississippi Shootout, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 17, 1973,
at 4 [hereinafter Nelson, Supreme Court to Rule].
269. Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91 at 14; Interview with Sam
Hardin, supra note 93.
270. See, e.g., Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 203.
271. Id. at fol. 160.
272. Id. at fol. 235.
273. Id. at fols. 204, 234.
274. Brief for Petitioner, app. at 90, Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) (No. 715908).
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that statement: a crowd that now swelled to fifty people repelled the officers’
second arrest attempt, and Jackson wriggled free.275
FIGURE 5: Copy of map used of First West Street during trial
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Jordan, Kaiser & Sessions, Civil Engineers, Map of Topographic Survey of First West
Street Area, Woodville, Mississippi, Natchez, MS, October 1970. This is a copy of the map
used by the defense during Leon Chambers’s trial. Witnesses plotted the positions they had
held during key events on June 14, 1969. Here, in the full map, one can imagine where the
police car was parked with its rear wheels in Main Street, and the rest of First West Street
would have been filled with people as police officers tried to arrest C.C. Jackson.
275.

Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 160–62.
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FIGURE 6: Detail of Figure 5
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This detail of the map shown in Figure 5 gives the viewer some idea of the proximity of
Jack’s Coffee Shop and Hayes Cafe & Pool Hall, as well as the alley where Aaron Liberty
shot Leon Chambers.

At this point the street was crowded. One block from the town square, the
narrow road and alleys were poorly lit and filled with people and parked
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cars.276 Some people were just trying to get through; others, like Sam Hardin,
came from nearby cafes to see what all the commotion was about.277
Somewhere amid the chaos was Leon Chambers. Although probably
armed, there is no evidence that Chambers participated in the physical
intervention of the arrest attempts. Chambers, a World War II veteran and a
homeowner,278 had lived with his wife and nine children in Woodville for
several years.279 With only a grammar school education, he worked in
construction and as a farm laborer.280 Still, he had had the honor, a few years
prior, of being the town’s first black police officer—a concession from one of
the successful boycotts.281 However, he served only briefly, resigning “when he
rejected orders ‘to look after the blacks’ but ignore white lawbreaking.”282
After this, Chambers continued to be active in the NAACP and with the
Deacons for Defense.283 Following the second arrest attempt on the evening of
June 14, Chambers was standing with others—maybe James Williams and
Gable McDonald—in a narrow alley between Hayes’s Cafe and Jack’s Coffee
Shop.
By this time the officers were in retreat. Forman, withdrawing from the
crowd, returned to the car in search of his rifle.284 At the same time, Officer
Geter was across the street from the cafe attempting to get information from
Neil Jarvis.285 Geter had specifically sought out Jarvis, a black man with whom
he was familiar, to gather information. But when Jarvis started talking about
dimes, Geter dismissed him as not having any valuable information and
“drifted back towards where Son was.”286 Then, when Forman reached the
patrol car to retrieve his gun, he noticed that the “riot gun,” a sawed-off doublebarrel 12-gauge shotgun, was missing from the police car.287
It became apparent that Liberty had sought out the gun. He stood in the
street facing away from the alley. With the riot gun in his right hand and the
276. Officer Geter testified that the street was so crowded when he arrived that the back end of
his police car stuck out into Main Street a block away. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at
fol. 203.
277. Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91, at 13.
278. Landsman, supra note 24, at 368; World War II Enlistment Record—Leon Chambers
(Dec. 23, 1943), in U.S. NAT’L ARCHIVES & RECORDS ADMIN., Electronic Army Serial Number
Merged File, ca. 1938–1946 (Enlistment Records), World War II Army Enlistment Records, THE
NAT’L ARCHIVES, at Rec. Grp. 64 (2002), http://aad.archives.gov/aad/record-detail.jsp?dt=893&
mtch=20&cat=WR26&tf=F&q=Leon+Chambers&bc=,sl,sd&rpp=10&pg=2&rid=5298575&rlst=481
8650,4949717,5092964,5298575,5324095,7102268,7164844,7167143,8573552,732425.
279. See, e.g., MacKenzie, supra note 93.
280. See id.
281. See id.
282. Id.
283. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
284. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 161.
285. Id. at fol. 204.
286. Id. at fol. 205.
287. Id. at fol. 161.
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pistol from his holster in his left, he surveyed the rambunctious crowd. Then,
Liberty raised the sawed-off shotgun in the air, and, wanting to help his fellow
officers who were struggling with the crowd, he said—loud enough for the
crowd to hear—that he was “going to separate the niggers,”288 “those black son
of a bitches,”289 and that he would “get them niggers straight for you.”290
Hearing this and surveying Liberty’s threatening stance, a Deacon for Defense
took aim and fired five to six shots into Sonny Liberty’s back.291
Sonny staggered. He twisted toward the alley and told Officer Welch that
he had been shot.292 Welch in turn told Liberty to kill his assailant, and Liberty
fired two blasts from the shotgun down the alley in the direction from which
the pistol shots had come.293 The first shot seemed to the officers to have been
fired at no one in particular.294 It had the effect of scattering the crowd: the men
in the alley fled.295 The second shot seemed to the officers to have been taken
with more deliberate aim.296 While the officers at trial suggested that Liberty
deliberately took aim at Chambers, thus identifying him as his assailant, it is
unlikely that Liberty could have actually known who fired the shots that killed
him, since he was hit in the back and stumbled for a moment before turning
around. Nevertheless, as he fled down the alley, Chambers was hit by the
second blast: buckshot tore apart his head and neck. His wounds were so
devastating that the officers left him for dead.297
After firing the second shotgun cartridge, Liberty fell, discharging at least
one unintentional shot from the pistol in his left hand, which hit Welch in the
leg.298 The immediate focus of the officers became getting Liberty and Welch
to the hospital. As Forman sped to the hospital in Centreville, about fifteen
miles away, Aaron Liberty died in the back seat of the police car.299 Officers
Anthony and Geter returned to the station to get help without checking
Chambers’s body for signs of life or even a weapon.300
The Deacons in the crowd likewise took swift action. After witnessing the
shooting of Chambers, Sam Hardin testified that he went into Hayes’s Cafe and
told those inside—including Gable McDonald—that “Mr. Chambers had been
288. Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91, at 13.
289. Nelson, Supreme Court to Rule, supra note 268.
290. Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91, at 13.
291. See Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217, 218 (Miss. 1971) (per curiam); Interview by
Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91, at 14.
292. Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d at 218.
293. Id.
294. Id.
295. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 286 (1973).
296. Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d at 218.
297. See Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 226–27.
298. Id. at fol. 226. At trial, the prosecution first tried to demonstrate that this later pistol shot
that hit Welch may have come from another shooter, James Williams, but never fully followed up—in
all likelihood because they knew it was from Liberty’s pistol.
299. See Town Policeman Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, supra note 245.
300. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 207, 209, 226.
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killed.”301 Heading back outside to find a few men gathered around Chambers’s
body, Hardin was informed that Chambers was still alive.302 Having found no
gun in Chambers’s possession, Hardin helped place Chambers into the back
seat of James Williams’s car.303
Importantly, Gable McDonald would assert at a preliminary hearing that it
was not until after the sound of the shotgun fire that he went toward Hayes’s
Cafe that evening. This assertion, however, was contrary to the testimony of
Sam Hardin, Berkley Turner, and earlier recanted confessions of McDonald
himself. According to McDonald’s latter account, he and Turner had been
drinking at Gladys’s Cafe, and by the time they reached Hayes’s, all of the
police officers were gone and men were helping place Chambers in Williams’s
car.304 Yet McDonald was likely in the crowd when the shooting commenced,
as his testimony is not only uncorroborated by any other account but also
directly contradicted by testimony of both the man he was allegedly with at the
time and a staff member at Gladys’s Cafe.305
Nevertheless, it is undisputed that James Williams, Berkley Turner, and
Gable McDonald drove Leon Chambers to the same hospital where Forman
had brought Liberty and Welch. Hardin and two other men followed close
behind in Hardin’s truck.306 According to McDonald, again at the preliminary
hearing, the car ride to the hospital was silent. Although he was aware
Chambers had been shot because “it looked like his brains was coming down
his face,” McDonald claimed that he did not inquire about the evening’s events
despite claiming that, at that time, he was unaware of how Chambers had been
injured.307 Upon arrival, the hospital staff refused to provide Chambers with a
stretcher. Instead, two of the men helped Chambers—riddled with buckshot in
his brain—walk into the hospital.308 Once there, the hospital would not permit
any visitors.309
301. Id. at fol. 282.
302. Id.
303. Id. at fols. 282, 290.
304. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 114.
305. Id. app. at 123. Additionally, William Vaughn would later testify that he saw an armed
Gable McDonald outside the back door of Gladys’s Cafe shortly after the shooting, but never inside
the cafe before the shooting. Id. app. at 140–44.
306. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 282–83.
307. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 54.
Q. Now, you tell us that there was no conversation that come up between you and James
Williams or anybody about how this man got hurt that was laying there in the back of the
car?
A. No, sir, no conversation.
Q. No conversation about it?
A. No, sir.
Q. Well, you didn’t inquire about who shot him or was he shot or anything?
A. No, sir.
Id.
308. Id. app. at 71–72.
309. Id.
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B. Charges, Investigations, Confessions
Immediately following the shooting, it does not appear that any law
enforcement official was interested in discerning who shot Liberty. In all
likelihood, had Chambers not survived, there would never have been any
investigation, and the town simply would have blamed the murder on him
regardless of his guilt or innocence. But once they found out Chambers was
alive, the town had little choice but to prosecute him. The boycott had already
pushed white merchants to the verge of closure, and the white power structure
could not risk civil rights activists reframing the incident as one of police
brutality that left an innocent person dead. Any assertion of Chambers’s
innocence would contradict the official story that several black males had
interfered with law and order.
Ostensibly understanding as much, by midnight Sheriff McGraw had
surveyed the situation, determined that Chambers was in fact guilty of murder,
and placed guards outside his hospital room “[s]o there wouldn’t be any
disturbance and so he wouldn’t escape.”310 McGraw also called in the state
highway patrol—appreciated by the town for making “them” behave311—for
assistance in keeping the peace that weekend.312 In the meantime, Officers
Welch and Forman, along with Chief of Police Earl James, went back to
Hayes’s Cafe and conducted a cursory search for the gun.313 In addition,
Officer Geter and Sheriff McGraw made another survey of the scene after
midnight, but “[i]t was dark and [they] couldn’t tell anything.”314
That night the police department was also busy detaining male civil rights
activists, including many known to be Deacons. Five men would be arrested
over the course of the night and charged with obstruction of justice, but others
like Sam Hardin were simply detained for questioning.315 Each man was
questioned individually as the police department attempted to turn members of
the Deacons against each other. Police told each Deacon that another member
had already revealed his name, thus exerting pressure to reveal the identity of
the shooter or names of other members of the secret organizations.316 The
process continued throughout the night, more for the purpose of harassment,
less for the purpose of investigation.
In fact, throughout the next morning the search for the shooter was still
underway. At least one officer was reportedly making rounds in the black

310. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 227, 461. At this point, Chambers had
still not been charged with any crime.
311. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
312. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 460.
313. Id. at fols. 230–31.
314. Id. at fol. 274.
315. See Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91, at 14–15. See
generally Town Policeman Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, supra note 245.
316. Interview by Plater Robinson with Sam Hardin, supra note 91, at 15.
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community to gather information about possible suspects.317 At trial, Officer
Geter testified that in the days following the shootings, Welch and “the entire
Sheriff’s Department ma[d]e a diligent search and inquiry for [the gun].”318
However, these searches and inquiries did not produce any results other than a
bit of buckshot in a tree just feet from where Chambers had been “cut []
down.”319
In collaboration with the police department’s continued search, white city
officials convened a special session on Sunday, June 15, 1969. The powerful
white men on the town council passed three town ordinances and one county
ordinance in an effort to suppress any activity that might occur as news of the
events spread. Each ordinance was posted in the town’s newspaper the
following Friday. The first ordinance closed Hayes’s Cafe as a public
nuisance—no records indicate whether the restaurant was later allowed to
reopen.320 A second ordinance imposed a curfew between the hours of 8:00
p.m. and 5:30 a.m.321 The third town ordinance and the county ordinance set
limits on the hours during which beer could be sold.322 How long these
ordinances were in effect and how strictly they were enforced is not known, but
neither violations nor protests were reported in the local newspaper.
The shooting, however, received immediate local press coverage. Local
newspapers swiftly constructed a narrative of the June 14 incident that
concealed police brutality, recklessness, and the exploitation of black police
officers, and valorized African Americans who cooperated with the whites to
maintain the Southern way of life. Because Woodville’s town paper was
printed weekly on Fridays, the first report of Liberty’s death was in the Natchez
Democrat, a daily paper that often covered significant events that occurred in
neighboring Woodville. The Natchez Democrat’s Sunday, June 15, 1969, front
page read “1 Dead 2 Shot In W’ville.”323 The accompanying story, like the one
that ran in Jackson, Mississippi, the same day, was short and simply reported
that an incident had occurred the previous evening.324
But by June 18, the Natchez Democrat began running more incendiary
stories about the shooting, including a reprint of Tom Etheridge’s column, the

317. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 216.
318. Id. at fols. 228, 274.
319. Id. at fols. 216, 275.
320. Town Policeman Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, supra note 245; An Ordinance:
Removing Public Nuisance, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, June 20, 1969 at 4 (notes from primary source
on file with author).
321. An Ordinance: Removing Public Nuisance, supra note 320.
322. Id.
323. 1 Dead 2 Shot In W’ville, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, June 15, 1969, at 1.
324. Id.; Woodville Policeman Slain, Deputy Wounded, CLARION-LEDGER, June 15, 1969, at
1. A follow-up story on Monday reported that arrests had been made and murder charges had been
filed against Leon Chambers. Murder Charge Filed in Death of Policeman, CLARION-LEDGER, June
16, 1969, at 1 (notes from primary source on file with author).
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“Mississippi Notebook,” originally printed in Jackson’s Clarion-Ledger.325 The
essay, reprinted with praise, was titled “Plight of Negro Policeman Shown,”
and it illuminated how at least some Mississippians, and likely many locals,
understood the role of black police officers. For example, the essay
mischaracterized the black community’s motives for demanding black police
officers: “Oddly enough, while black leaders have demanded that Negroes be
given a ‘fair share’ of police jobs, it appears that many Negroes expect colored
cops to show favoritism to members of their race.”326 Etheridge ignored the
complaints of police brutality and the unwillingness of many southern police
departments to protect blacks from physical harm or carry out justice.
Etheridge’s essay likewise demonstrated why hiring black officers often
did not produce the desired results in the black community when he related his
perception of the unique challenges experienced by black police officers:
A colored officer can easily find himself ostracized as “a white man’s
nigger” or “uncle Tom” if his efforts at law enforcement are too
vigorous to suit some members of his race. . . . The black cop may find
himself marked for violence and even death at the hands of resentful
extremists of his race. . . . Making it bad especially for colored officers
is the fact that their race is responsible for major crimes far out of
proportion to the colored population.327
While Etheridge’s characterization of the situation in Woodville exaggerated
and mischaracterized the criminal population, some in the black community did
consider Liberty an Uncle Tom.328 He served on the force knowing he could
not stop white lawbreakers even when they carried out violence against blacks.
He served on weekends, when the force needed additional patrols for arrests of
marchers and picketers. Further, although it is unlikely that Liberty was
“marked,” Etheridge might have been right that Liberty was murdered for “too
vigorously” enforcing the law. It was clear to some in the black community that
Liberty was not on the side of civil rights.329 His actions on the night of his
death demonstrate that his presence was insufficient to secure humane
treatment when a black person was arrested.330

325. Plight of Negro Policeman Shown, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, June 18, 1969, at B6 (notes
from primary source on file with author).
326. Id.
327. Id.
328. Aaron Liberty’s pallbearers included many whites, including Sheriff McGraw and other
policemen. Town Policeman Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, supra note 245; MacKenzie, supra
note 93 (reporting that Liberty was “viewed by some Negroes as an Uncle Tom for protecting patrons
at local stores during an economic boycott”).
329. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
330. But see BROWN-NAGIN, supra note 41, at 12 (discussing the difficult choices
“accommodationists” were forced to make and reminding the readers that a simplified view of
“accommodationists” within the civil rights movement “underestimates both the enormous pressures
that segregation imposed on blacks and the ingenuity and complexity of blacks’ response to racism”).
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In contrast to Etheridge’s essay, which connected the Woodville incident
to the broader increase in black police officers in Mississippi, the Woodville
Republican’s coverage of the event was personal. Based on interviews with
Sheriff McGraw and Officer Forman, the Friday paper reported details of the
event including how Forman and Liberty were ambushed at the scene as well as
the arrests of James Williams and Berkley Turner.331 But even more interesting
are the contents of the weekly column, “Localisms,” written by John Lewis, the
small paper’s publisher.332 Lewis described Liberty as “one of Woodville’s
valued citizens” and a personal “lifelong friend.”333 “[W]ithout equivocation,”
wrote Lewis, Liberty “held both our respect and our esteem. Hard working,
honorable, dedicated to the principles in which he believed, unfailingly cheerful
and polite, Son set an excellent example.”334
Then, Lewis emphatically blamed the black community for Liberty’s
death, referring to the men at Hayes’s Cafe as a “savage mob,” and making it
clear that “[i]t would take a great stretch of the imagination to bring ‘police
brutality’ into the issue.”335 He continued his condemnation, describing “the
shock of realization of the level which disregard and actual contempt for police
authority have reached among a certain element of our less desirable
citizenry.”336 Without increased efforts to maintain law and order, Lewis
predicted that “hoodlumism and rampant crime can and will swiftly sweep our
fine community into a state of anarchy which will destroy it.”337
Lewis’s contrasting descriptions of local law enforcement and the black
community provided a frame for his readers to understand the black
community’s discontent. His editorial constructed a narrative that placed the
blame for the beating of C.C. Jackson, the bullet wounds of Leon Chambers,
and the death of Aaron Liberty, on the black community’s disregard for law
and order. The narrative concealed possible guilt of whites in conducting a
violent arrest, exploiting a black police officer, and pursuing the murder
conviction of a man who, in all likelihood, was innocent.
While the white press created its own account of the evening’s events,
there remained a hidden narrative of events: hidden in part because the white
community was not entirely interested in the truth, and in part because the
Deacons had something to hide. While the police department was conducting a
perfunctory investigation and the town was passing ordinances, the Deacons
were conducting their own investigation of sorts.

331.
332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.

Town Policeman Killed, 2 Wounded Saturday Night, supra note 245.
Lewis, supra note 254.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Although Gable McDonald testified that the trip to the hospital with
Chambers was rather quiet, Berkley Turner testified about a more conversant
McDonald on the way home.338 McDonald told Turner that he had shot Sonny
Liberty.339 One might suspect that since both men were Deacons, they likely
discussed the details of the evening and how to proceed next. The men then
drove to the home of the Deacons’ spokesman Red Caine, where several armed
Deacons gathered to regroup.340 Before the night was over, several guns
changed hands: Hardin left his gun with Caine’s neighbor; Gable left
Chambers’s .38 revolver at the neighbor’s and left his .22 revolver with
Caine.341 After the meeting at Caine’s, Hardin gave McDonald a ride home,
and on the way, according to Hardin’s testimony, McDonald again confessed
that he had shot Liberty.342 Hardin would also later testify that he saw
McDonald shoot Liberty.343 Hence, the confession must have come as no
surprise but rather may have been part of a larger conversation about the
Deacons’ plans for what to do next. In fact, Hardin told McDonald, “Well, you
didn’t have to tell me because I was lookin’ at you when you done it.”344
The next afternoon, McDonald showed the .38 revolver to his neighbor,
Albert Carter, and asked for advice on what he should do with Chambers’s
gun.345 Carter remembered telling McDonald that he should return it to
Chambers’s wife.346 Carter would also testify that McDonald confessed that he
had shot Liberty, saying that if “he hadn’t shot [Liberty], [Liberty] was going to
shoot him.”347 After staying a short while longer, McDonald took the .38 pistol
and drove home. However, worried that an officer would see the gun and pull
McDonald over, Carter also testified that McDonald stopped the car on the way

338. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 129.
339. Id.
340. Id. app. at 72.
341. Id. app. at 72, 138. The .38 revolver was discussed at great length at the trial. Both sides
were interested in it, its uniquely decorated handle, and its owner. However, the gun appears to be
rather immaterial to identifying the shooter as Leon Chambers or James Williams, even if it did belong
to one of them, because the autopsy revealed that Liberty was shot with six bullets from a 22 revolver
like the one Gable McDonald purchased in July 1969 and had “stolen” from him around the time of
the shooting. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 285.
342. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 285.
343. Id. at fol. 282.
344. Nelson, Supreme Court to Rule, supra note 268.
345. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 137–38. That morning, McDonald had visited
Carter around eight or nine. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 286. The two men
chatted about the events of the night before. Carter later remembered McDonald relaying to him that
“Aaron Liberty got killed and Chambers got shot, he wasn’t dead [the night before] but [McDonald]
was pretty sure [Chambers] was dead by [that morning].” Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at
135. Late in the morning, Hardin joined McDonald at Carter’s home to give McDonald the .38 pistol.
Id.
346. Id. app. at 137.
347. Id. app. at 136–37.
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home and buried the gun. “[H]e didn’t want the law to stop him. He didn’t have
nairn and he had got rid of the one he done the killing with.”348
In the days and months that followed, James Williams and Leon
Chambers were indicted for the murder of Aaron Liberty, and McDonald—who
was in his thirties and had worked as a laborer in the area—continued to leave a
trail of suspicious behavior. For example, upon seeing Berkley Turner the week
following the shooting, McDonald warned Turner not to “mess him up.”349 To
Turner, this only confirmed that McDonald was the shooter. Then, in early July
1969, McDonald purchased a second .22 revolver to replace the gun that he
claimed at trial was stolen from him.350 By this time he had moved to
Louisiana,351 where he lived and worked in a sugar mill while his wife and son
remained in Woodville.
In November 1969, McDonald’s wife wrote him. She related to him that
James Stokes, a Natchez Deacon and the Deacons’ state spokesman, wanted to
speak with him.352 The weekend after he received the request, McDonald met
with Reverend Stokes at his Natchez gas station. Later, when recanting his
confession, McDonald claimed that Stokes had asked him to confess to the
murder in writing at this meeting.353 According to McDonald, the Deacons had
a plan to sue the town for false charges against Williams and Chambers, and
Stokes offered McDonald an opportunity to be part of the scheme.354 Allegedly,
if he signed a written confession, he could collect part of the monetary reward
that would result from the lawsuit.355 McDonald also claimed that Stokes
guaranteed McDonald that he would not go to jail after making the written
confession.356 That weekend, after allegedly being coached extensively by
Stokes on what to say, McDonald gave an oral confession under oath to
Williams’s and Chambers’s lawyers, with Stokes present.357
The lawyers took the transcribed confession, and according to Sheriff
McGraw, attempted to use it as leverage against the district attorney.358
McGraw recalled the discussion thusly: Chambers’s attorneys told the district
attorney that there was a sworn third party confession but would not reveal the
confessor’s identity.359 The attorneys then asked, based on this new
development, if the state would provide an opportunity for Williams and

348.
349.
350.
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.

Id. app. at 137.
Id. app. at 129.
Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 453.
Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 88.
Id. app. at 94–95.
Id. app. at 99.
Id. app. at 100.
Id.
Id. app. at 99–100.
Id. app. at 108–13.
Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 463.
Id.
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Chambers to be released on bond.360 When the district attorney refused,
preferring to keep Williams and Chambers in jail without bond, the lawyers
were forced to surrender the written confession and allow McDonald into
custody for the murder of Aaron Liberty.361
While in custody, McDonald received a few visitors. First, Sheriff
McGraw came to visit, but having been told not to speak with police unless
accompanied by his lawyer, McDonald let McGraw know that he did not wish
to speak with him.362 McGraw was undeterred. He knew the McDonalds well,
and had known Gable McDonald “[e]ver since [he] was a little old boy,”363 so
McGraw contacted Gable McDonald’s father.364 Soon thereafter, McDonald’s
father visited him in jail.365 After speaking with Gable for a few moments in
private, McDonald’s father called in Sheriff McGraw and said, “Sheriff, Gable
wants to tell you the truth of what happened.”366 With McGraw listening,
McDonald recanted his confession.
After hearing McDonald speak, McGraw took swift action on his behalf.
McGraw later testified that he knew that McDonald was too uneducated to be
capable of forming the responses contained within the written confession.367 He
advised the McDonalds to secure a lawyer, and even drove McDonald to
Jackson, Mississippi, for a polygraph test.368 Given McGraw’s familiarity with
the McDonald family, it is little surprise that the known Klansman played a
central role in McDonald’s recanting. By recanting his confession, McDonald
opened the door for the prosecutor to charge Stokes, a prominent Deacon
leader, with soliciting perjury.369
In assessing these accounts provided by McGraw and McDonald, some
elements seem more plausible than others. Notably, by the time McDonald
provided his account of the conversation with Stokes, he was no longer a
Deacon and instead was collaborating with Sheriff McGraw. However, there is
evidence that there had been, in fact, discussion of a suit against the town for

360. Id.
361. Id.
362. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 110–11.
363. Id. app. at 110.
364. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 463.
365. Id.
366. Id. at fol. 464.
367. Id. at fols. 463–66.
368. Id. at fol. 466.
369. Id. at fol. 317. The Woodville Republican reported that “James Stokes of Natchez, who
identifies himself as spokesman for the State Deacons for Defense, was charged with attempted
subordination of perjury. He is accused of attempting to procure false testimony in the murder case
of . . . Leon Chambers.” Grant Change Venue Plea for Chambers & Williams, WOODVILLE
REPUBLICAN, Mar. 13, 1970, at 1. Although the charges were eventually dropped once Chambers’s
case had been tried, it enabled the prosecutor to proceed with limited participation from Stokes.
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the injuries sustained by Chambers and the wrongful prosecution of the two
civil rights activists.370
Further, there are at least a couple of reasons why Stokes might have
helped to prepare McDonald for the confession to the lawyers. The first could
be the one given by McDonald at the preliminary hearing: Stokes may have
indeed been plotting with McDonald to create a false confession. Alternatively,
Stokes may have intended to help McDonald craft a mostly true confession that
was embellished so as to make it clear that McDonald’s actions were in selfdefense. The second scenario seems at least as likely as the first, since the
elements of the confession that do not align with any other account of the
evening are those that emphasize that the shooting was in self-defense.371 First,
the written confession places McDonald behind a tree, farther back than where
Chambers was standing. According to the confession, Liberty shot first, hitting
the tree and spooking McDonald, who in turn fired six shots from his .22
revolver at Liberty. Liberty then shot Chambers. However, this version
emphasizing the self-defense aspect of McDonald’s actions is implausible both
because Liberty was shot in the back, and because all accounts uniformly
describe the six revolver shots as occurring before Liberty fired either shot
from the riot gun. However, despite the account’s improbability, it seems at
least plausible that Stokes and McDonald only doctored the story of how the
events unfolded, not the truth of who the shooter was.
At least one thing is clear: the public account retold in the local press was
incomplete. It created clear lines between good and evil where, in truth, the
lines were blurred. It missed the true reasons why the shooter shot Liberty and
why the black community desperately sought to create their own protective
organization since not even a black police officer could offer more safety.
Moreover, the same overt stereotypes and prejudices at work in the press
account of June 14 were at work during Chambers’s trial.
C. Chambers v. Mississippi
Although traditionally understood as a decision about the admission of
evidence at trial, Chambers v. Mississippi is a civil rights case—both because
the decision prevented Mississippi’s local courts from using rules of evidence
to prevent African Americans from receiving fair trials, but also more broadly
because civil rights activity in the small town motivated the facts of the case.
While the goals, strategies, and activities of civil rights activists in Woodville
were largely unconcerned with the use of the legal system as a strategy or the
justice system as a target for change, the trial at issue in the Supreme Court’s

370. See, e.g., County Officers Named in Suit on Jury Selection, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN,
Feb. 19, 1971, at 1.
371. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 88–93.
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decision was intricately bound up in the civil rights activity within the
community.
1. The Trial
Leon Chambers’s trial began a little over a year after the shooting took
place. The time between the initial filing of charges and the three-day trial was
filled with strategic maneuvering by both the prosecution and defense. The
district attorney brought murder charges not only against Leon Chambers, but
also against James Williams—the outspoken civil rights activist who drove
Chambers to the hospital.372 Upon indictment in October 1969, the two men’s
lawyer, George West, Jr., immediately asked the court to order both Chambers
and Williams to be committed to the Mississippi State Hospital for the Insane
in Whitfield, Mississippi.373 Although the judge granted the uncontested motion
for psychiatric examination, both Chambers and Williams were held without
bail for two months before finally being committed to the hospital on
December 16, 1969—making it impossible to spend the holidays with their
families.374 On January 21, 1970, both men were diagnosed as competent and
sane individuals and released into the custody of the Woodville Police
Department without bail.375 The psychiatric evaluation had, as planned, bought
time—not an insanity defense. The delay gave James Stokes and the attorneys
enough time to investigate other possible shooters and track down Gable
McDonald for the signed confession.
The success in obtaining the written confession, however, was short lived.
At McDonald’s December 1969 preliminary hearing, he officially recanted his
confession and was released from custody without any charges filed against
him.376 Williams and Chambers continued to be held without bail through
February 1970.377
372. Nelson, Supreme Court to Rule, supra note 268.
373. Suggestion of Insanity of Defendants, at fol. 7, in Combined Court Records, State v.
Chambers, 252 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1971) (No. 46378). Whitfield is over a two-hour drive from
Woodville.
374. Letter from A.G. Anderson, Psychiatrist, to James A. Torrey, Judge, 6th Dist., Meadville,
Miss. (Jan. 22, 1970), at fols. 25–26, in Combined Court Records, State v. Chambers, 252 So. 2d 217
(Miss. 1971) (No. 46378) [hereinafter Letter from A.G. Anderson, Psychiatrist, to James A. Torrey,
Judge, regarding James Williams]; Letter from A.G. Anderson, Psychiatrist, to James A. Torrey,
Judge, 6th Dist., Meadville, Miss. (Jan. 22, 1970), at fols. 27–28, in Combined Court Records, State v.
Chambers 252 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1971) [hereinafter Letter from A.G. Anderson, Psychiatrist, to James
A. Torrey, Judge, regarding Leon Chambers] (No. 46378).
375. Letter from A.G. Anderson, Psychiatrist, to James A. Torrey, Judge, regarding Leon
Chambers, supra note 374, at fols. 27–28.
376. See Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 19–59.
377. A habeas corpus petition was filed on behalf of Chambers and Williams that claimed that
“at present, both defendants are being unlawfully detained against their will by Burthell McGraw, duly
elected sheriff of Wilkinson County.” Bond Hearing Set for Chambers and Williams Friday,
WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Feb. 20, 1970, at 1. Chambers and Williams asked for bond in a reasonable
sum. About a week after the petition was filed, the Woodville Republican reported that the bond
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By March 1970, Clay Tucker, founding member of the Woodville White
Citizens’ Council, had found his way onto the prosecution’s legal team.378
Although Lenox Forman—who was trouble enough for the black
community379—was the current district attorney, Tucker slithered his way into
the case through “strictly voluntary” employment as Special Prosecutor.380
Tucker was a retired district attorney himself, and he had remained active in
town affairs. In addition to being a member of the town’s planning commission
and the Citizens’ Council, he was an informant for the Mississippi Sovereignty
Commission. He once wrote to the Commission asking for all of the local
license plate numbers recorded at civil rights events in Jackson so that he could
straighten out the kids when they returned to Wilkinson County.381 Tucker also
collaborated with Sheriff McGraw in maintaining a complete list of all NAACP
members in Woodville.382

hearing was delayed due to the illness of the judge. Habeas Corpus Bond Hearing Delayed by Illness
of Judge, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Feb. 27, 1970, at 1. Finally, in March, the arraignment hearing
was held. 2 Murder Cases, Long Civil List, Face Court Term, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Mar. 6,
1970, at 1.
378. Request for Information Relative to the Employment and Compensation of Special
Prosecutor, at fols. 35–36, in Combined Court Records, State v. Chambers, 252 So. 2d 217 (Miss.
1971) (No. 46378) [hereinafter Request for Information].
379. See, e.g., Michael Rowe, Contemporary Prosecutions of Civil Rights Era Crimes: An
Argument Against Retroactive Application of Statute of Limitations Amendments, 101 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 699, 700 (2011). For example, in 1964, Lenox Forman helped to secure the release of
two white men who brutally terrorized and murdered two young black men. On May 2, 1964, while
hitchhiking Charles Moore and Henry Hezekiah Dee accepted a ride from James Ford Seale. A truck
with three coconspirators followed Seale’s car into a secluded area. Moore and Dee were tied “to trees
and beat[en] . . . with ‘bean poles’” while being interrogated. Id. at 700. The two young men were
eventually “tied to an engine block and dropped into the river, all while they were still alive.” Id. Half a
year later, Seale and a Charles Marcus Edwards were charged with the murders. Edwards confessed to
the beating and Seale confessed to the murder. Nevertheless, Lenox Forman announced that he would
bring the case before a grand jury, an announcement he knew would end the investigation since no
white grand jury in that area of Mississippi would indict Edwards or Seale even with their confessions.
Id. According to a recent newspaper article about ongoing civil rights era prosecutions, Edwards and
Seale spread rumors that the arresting law enforcement officers had beaten them, providing Forman
with an opportunity to back off the men’s prosecution. In a meeting on January 5, 1965—despite both
men’s confessions—Forman met with the local sheriff, the Assistant Attorney General, and
Mississippi Highway Patrol investigators to inform them that he did not have enough evidence to send
the case to the grand jury. Just a week later, Forman filed a motion to dismiss charges that was
immediately granted. Donna Ladd, James Ford Seale: A Trail of Documents Tells the Story, JACKSON
FREE PRESS, Jan. 31, 2007, available at http://www.jacksonfreepress.com/index.php/site/comments/
james_ford_seale_a_trail_of_documents_tells_the_story.
380. Reply of Respondent to Request for Information Relative to the Employment and
Compensation of Special Prosecutor, at fol. 109, in Combined Court Records, State v. Chambers, 252
So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1971) (No. 46378) [hereinafter Reply to Request for Information].
381. Virgil Downing, NAACP Activity – Wilkinson County (Jan. 25, 1961) (unpublished
investigative report), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on
file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission Files, Mississippi Department of Archives &
History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-21-1-1-1).
382. Letter from Clay B. Tucker, President, Wilkinson Cnty. Citizens’ Council, to Louis W.
Hollis, Exec. Dir. of Jackson Citizens’ Council (Jan. 7, 1961), available at http://mdah.state ms.us/
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It was only natural then, that the Citizens’ Council leader stepped in to
“advise” the Liberty family on the matter.383 The Libertys had been “faithful
employees” on the Tucker family farm for years, with Aaron Liberty “born and
practically reared” there.384 Tucker happily informed the Libertys that he would
assist in the prosecution of Leon Chambers as Aaron Liberty’s killer in any
way he could—quite an odd turn of events given that Mrs. Liberty believed that
Chambers was innocent.385
Defense counsel George West, Jr. was a perfect antithesis to Tucker. West
was a young but prominent black attorney in Natchez. In 1962, West had
graduated from Tougaloo College during a period in which Tougaloo was at the
forefront of civil rights activity in Mississippi.386 Six years later, in 1968, West
received his law degree from recently and dramatically integrated Ole Miss.387
He was a member of the NAACP, Adams County Democratic Club, Natchez
Business and Civil League, Natchez School Board, and a few other fraternal
organizations.388 Although West was involved in the civil rights movement, the
Natchez Democrat respectfully described him as an esteemed lawyer and
speaker.389 In fact, West was friends with two white attorneys in Natchez,
Clyde Mullins and Cecil Smith, with whom he collaborated to form the defense
team for Williams and Chambers. Mullins and Smith provided the defense with
much needed experience. In fact, the October 1969 indictment proceedings
were delayed while Mullins overcame an illness, since West had been a lawyer
for less than a year and had no experience in capital cases.390
Still, by March 1970, the team had made some progress and was hard at
work trying to prevent Tucker’s involvement in the case: the defense filed a
“request for information relative to the employment and compensation of
special prosecutor.”391 At the arraignment, the defense also filed a motion for
change of venue fueled in part by Tucker and the Woodville Police
arrec/digital_archives/sovcom/index.php (on file with the Mississippi State Sovereignty Commission
Files, Mississippi Department of Archives & History, SCRID No. 2-110-0-23-1-1-1).
383. Reply to Request for Information, supra note 380, at fol. 109.
384. Id.
385. MacKenzie, supra note 93. The article also includes McGraw’s response to hearing Mrs.
Liberty’s belief that Mr. Chambers did not kill her husband: “She had a lot of problems after his death.
She was upset. Then people came around and told her that.” Id.
386. George West Jr. Chairman of UGF, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, Oct. 2, 1969, at 9A (notes
from primary source on file with author); see also About Tougaloo College: Our History, TOUGALOO
C., http://tougaloo.edu/content/History/index htm (last visited Jan. 25, 2013). During the 1960s
Tougaloo was a launching ground for protests and sit-ins and a safe haven for young black activists.
387. George West Jr. Chairman of UGF, supra note 386.
388. Id.
389. Id.; George F. West, Jr. Ferriday Speaker, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, Sept. 28, 1969, at 3A
(notes from primary source on file with author).
390. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 11–13. Mullins was severely harassed
by Natchez law enforcement for participation on the case. Nelson, Supreme Court to Rule, supra note
268.
391. Request for Information, supra note 244, at fol. 35.
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Department’s expressed eagerness in seeing Williams and Chambers
convicted.392 The motion stated that Tucker’s “influence in this matter is
boundless in Wilkinson County and will work to the prejudice, prejudgment,
and ill will of these defendants, thus preventing and making impossible a fair
and impartial trial.”393 Additionally, Chambers’s lawyers expressed concern
over the possible effect the “prejudicial newspaper articles appearing in the
Natchez Democrat and [t]he Woodville Republican” might have on a Wilkinson
County jury.394 The motion to change venue was accompanied by supporting
affidavits from Mon Cree Allen and James Jolliff, Jr.—two of the most
prominent civil rights leaders in Woodville.395 Although the motion was
promptly granted, Amite County became the new venue.396 Misleadingly
named Liberty, Mississippi, the county seat of Amite County had a disturbing
legacy of oppression and violence against African Americans.397 The truth is
there were still very few places in 1970 where African Americans would
receive fair trials in Mississippi.398
As trial approached, apparently in an effort to secure the placement of
African Americans on the jury, or at least make note of their absence,
Chambers also made a request for a special venire, which the judge granted. As
requested, a list of sixty possible jurors was given to defense counsel at least a
day before trial began.399 Yet, despite these steps, thirteen white residents of
Amite County were selected for the jury.400 Later, after Chambers’s case was
on appeal, several civil rights activists from Woodville, including Leon
Chambers, filed suit against Wilkinson County for unfair jury rolls.401 It is
possible that Chambers’s attorneys—among them at least West would have
been apprised of civil rights litigation strategies—wanted to document any
injustice in the trial process either for later appeals or future lawsuits.
On Friday, October 23, 1970, the Woodville Republican announced that
James Williams and Leon Chambers would be tried the following Monday in
392. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 6–7.
393. Id. app. at 6.
394. Id. app. at 7.
395. See, e.g., Letter from W. Webb Burke, Dir., Miss. State Sovereignty Comm’n, to Richard
Watson, Attorney at Law, supra note 217; Cole, Boycott, Oct. 28, 1966, supra note 182;
Memorandum from Erle Johnston, Jr., Dir., Miss. State Sovereignty Comm’n, to File, supra note 148.
396. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 9.
397. Just one county to the east of Wilkinson County, Amite County was also in the heart of
Klan country. Like elsewhere in southwest Mississippi, no civil rights group truly took hold in the
area, and white supremacists operated without restraint. See also supra note 108 and accompanying
text.
398. Landsman, supra note 24, at 367–68.
399. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 113. No record survives if any
objections were made. Although the defendants also requested that the voir dire be transcribed for the
record, it appears that the court reporter was merely present and available to record any objections the
defense wished to enter into the record. Id. at fol. 29.
400. MacKenzie, supra note 93.
401. County Officers Named in Suit on Jury Selection, supra note 370, at 1.
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Amite County.402 The trial lasted three days, during which Chambers’s
attorneys were not permitted to mount a complete defense. The defense team’s
objections and development of the record indicate that they expected to appeal
the conviction long before the verdict was given.
The prosecution presented its case during the first two days of trial.
Prosecutor Lenox Forman called the coroner, who testified to Liberty’s wounds
and concluded that the gun used to shoot Liberty was a .22 caliber handgun.403
But the crux of the prosecution’s case rested in the testimony of all four white
police officers that were at Hayes’s Cafe on June 14, 1969.404 Despite Mullins’s
objections that Forman was leading the witness and that the testimony was
irrelevant, Forman asked the officers for descriptions of the crowd and
interactions with C.C. Jackson.405 The prosecution’s strategy included an
attempt to paint a picture for the all-white jury of an unruly group of African
Americans who attacked, without provocation, several white police officers and
one accommodating black officer.
The prosecution supplemented its depiction of the scene with the officers’
testimony that Leon Chambers was the shooter. Officer James Forman testified
first, recalling that from twenty-five feet away he was unable to see the shooter
because there were so many people were crowded into the confined space.406
Similarly, Officer Herman Anthony testified that he was unable to see the
shooter.407 Despite the crowd that obstructed the views of Officers Forman and
Anthony, Officer Gordon Geter testified, with prosecutor Lenox Forman
leading the way, that he had seen Leon Chambers shoot Aaron Liberty.408
Geter, who was a full fifteen feet away, “in the line of fire,” and very “worried
about old number one at that time,”409 testified that he nevertheless saw Leon
Chambers shoot at Liberty and then turn to run further down the alley.410 In
support of Officer Geter’s testimony, Officer Waldo Welch testified that,
although he did not see a gun in Chambers’s hand, he did see Chambers
“throw[] his right hand down” as the gun shots began.411 And even though
Anthony had been unable to see down the alley from which the shots had come,
402. Murder Trial Local Men in Lib. Monday, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Oct. 23, 1970, at 1.
403. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 150. Recall that Chambers owned a .38
pistol.
404. Id. at fol. 130.
405. See, e.g., id. at fols. 157–58, 161–62, 204, 206–07, 209, 234.
406. Id. at fols. 161, 165.
407. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 61.
408. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 205, 215. Mullins objected to Lenox
Forman’s leading questions throughout Forman’s direct of Officer Geter, but the objections had little
effect on the form of the questions or the responses the questions elicited. Id. at fol. 207.
409. Id. at fol. 215.
410. Id. at fols. 215–16. Geter’s timeline is a bit murky. He also testified that at or around this
time he was also fighting with James Williams and attempting to arrest C.C. Jackson with Officer
Forman. Id. at fols. 234–35. His entire testimony is less than compelling. Without the help of Lenox
Forman’s leading questions, Geter’s testimony would have been rather questionable.
411. Id. at fols. 229–30.
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he obliged the prosecution’s leading questions by testifying that “[by] the way
he acted,” Liberty “knew who he was shooting at” and took “deliberate aim” at
Leon Chambers.412
The State rested on the second day of trial, having relied primarily on the
testimony of the four white police officers. In turn, the defense moved for a
directed verdict with regard to both James Williams and Leon Chambers.413 All
of the eyewitnesses identified Chambers, not Williams, as the shooter. In fact,
the only evidence presented against Williams was limited testimony alleging
that he had chanted “kill ‘em” and had physically confronted the police.414
Accordingly, the judge granted the defendants’ motion for directed verdict with
regard to James Williams.415 More appropriate to the testimony given, Williams
was eventually charged with obstruction of justice, to which he pleaded guilty
in return for a fine and time served, which was not insignificant.416 It seems that
James Williams was, first and foremost, guilty of being a vocal and visible civil
rights activist in Woodville, which made him a target for serious charges such
as murder despite a clear absence of evidence against him. And yet for
Chambers, the fact that he had been riddled with buckshot by Liberty’s riot gun
was enough to charge him with murder, and it took little more than a few white
witnesses to ensure his murder trial would continue.
Accordingly, Chambers’s attorneys began their defense late on the second
day. They not only recalled each of the four officers, but also ten new
witnesses. When questioning the officers, the defense focused primarily on
their investigations, especially on facts supporting the assertions in Gable
McDonald’s written confession. Sam Hardin then testified in detail about the
evening of June 14, 1969, and stated that he saw McDonald shoot Liberty.417
The defense also sought testimony from Hardin about the oral confession
McDonald had made to him the night of the shooting. The prosecution
promptly objected, and the court instructed the jury to disregard Hardin’s
testimony.418
However, Chambers’s innocence was supported by the testimony of a
parade of other African American witnesses. For example, William Vaughn—
Liberty’s first cousin—testified that he saw McDonald outside the back door of
Gladys’s Cafe, with a gun in his hand, only after the shooting had occurred.
412. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 62.
413. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 236.
414. See id. at fol. 114.
415. Id. at fol. 236.
416. Grand Jury Returns 12 Bills; Jolliff Indicted on 2 Counts, supra note 245, at 1. The fact
that the prosecution so doggedly pursued a conviction of James Williams despite virtually no evidence
indicating that he was the shooter suggests that the prosecution and police department sought the
murder convictions of at least James Williams, and likely Leon Chambers, for their involvement in
civil rights activity.
417. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 280–85.
418. Id. at fol. 285.
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This directly contradicted McDonald’s alibi.419 Thomas Russ also testified that
he and his wife were attempting to drive by Hayes’s Cafe when they became
mired in the crowd. From the car, Russ saw both Liberty and Chambers when
Liberty was shot: he “saw Leon Chambers and he did not shoot [Liberty].”420
To further develop the record, the defense then questioned two witnesses
outside the presence of the jury. Although the jury was not permitted to hear
this testimony,421 the defense sought to preserve it for an appeals court to later
review the case. Berkley Turner testified that, contrary to McDonald’s
testimony, he was not drinking with McDonald in Gladys’s Cafe at the time of
the shooting but instead was outside Hayes’s Cafe.422 Turner’s testimony
corroborated William Vaughn’s testimony that McDonald was not at Gladys’s
Cafe prior to the shooting. Turner further testified without the jury present that
on the way home from the hospital that night McDonald told him that he was
the real shooter, and that on a second occasion McDonald warned him not to
“mess him up” by telling anyone that he had confessed.423 Likewise out of
earshot of the jury, Albert Carter testified at length about who owned which
gun and about McDonald’s confession to him. Carter testified that McDonald
told him that he shot Liberty out of fear that Liberty was about to shoot him or
someone else.424 Mullins then submitted to the court that the jury should be
permitted to hear Carter’s testimony. However, Tucker argued that the defense
was attempting to impeach Gable McDonald—the defense’s own witness—
which was prohibited under Mississippi rules of evidence.425 Tucker’s
objection to the motion was sustained.
In addition to the eyewitnesses, the defense also called a gun salesman
from Natchez, Ronnie Booker, who sold McDonald both .22 caliber guns.
Booker’s sales records indicated that McDonald bought his first revolver on
July 9, 1968.426 The records also noted a second gun sale to McDonald on July
5, 1969.427 These sales records roughly corroborated the testimony given by
other defense witnesses: that McDonald had left his .22 caliber gun with Ed

419. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 140.
420. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 434.
421. Because the proposed testimony was objected to by the prosecution and sustained by the
judge, the defense was permitted only to elicit the testimony outside the hearing of the jury in order to
preserve a record for appeal.
422. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 122; Transcript of Trial Record, supra note
244, at fol. 160.
423. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 129. Turner was later arraigned for attempted
murder of his wife. Woodville Resident Shoots Wife Sunday, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, June 4, 1971
(notes from primary source on file with author).
424. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 134–39.
425. Id. app. at 139.
426. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 451.
427. Id. at fol. 453.
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Caine to dispose of immediately after the shooting, and that McDonald then
went with Carter to the Natchez gun store to replace it.428
The defense then called McDonald to the witness stand, despite an
ominous exchange at one of the pretrial hearings. On October 20, 1970, days
before trial, the defense attempted to reserve the right to complain of surprise if
the defense called McDonald at trial. In response, the prosecution objected to
the defense being able to treat Gable as a hostile or adverse witness. Although
the ruling on the motion was reserved for trial, the judge stated that the very
fact of making the motion suggested to him that the defense would not in fact
be surprised if McDonald testified contrary to his written confession.429 Thus, it
would be unlikely that the defense would be able to impeach McDonald if they
called him to the stand.
At trial, McDonald testified about the events of June 14 and his written
confession. During direct examination, McDonald showed signs of frustration
or perhaps hostility towards Mullins.430 Still, Mullins’s direct examination of
McDonald went on for some length and included reading the written confession
to the jury. However, given McDonald’s recanting of the confession and the
exclusion of the other oral confessions—not to mention the apparent coaching
by Reverend Stokes431—the written confession was insufficient on its own for
Chambers’s defense. Indeed, McDonald’s retraction of his confession went to
the jury without the contradictory testimony given by Turner and Carter.
Throughout the trial, and in particular through cross-examination of the
defense’s African American witnesses, the prosecution developed a theory that
Reverend Stokes and the Deacons for Defense had orchestrated a cover-up for
Chambers by framing McDonald.432 For example, Lenox Forman questioned
Hardin about his and McDonald’s Deacon membership.433 To further
undermine the credibility of the defense’s witnesses, the prosecution called
Sheriff McGraw as a rebuttal witness; his brazen testimony thus ended the third
and final day of trial. Over a defense objection, Sheriff McGraw testified that
“[i]n talking to the officers on the scene, [he] ascertained that Leon Chambers
is the one that did kill . . . Aaron Liberty, City Policeman.”434 Further finagled
through repeated objections, the prosecution finally drew out that McGraw had
been able to determine that McDonald had given a false confession largely
because McDonald was so uneducated that he could not have possibly put

428. Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 138–39.
429. Id. app. at 60–61.
430. Id. app. at 86. For example, when Mullins asked McDonald to review the written
confession for his signature, McDonald replied that he had already told the court once that he could not
read. However, literacy was not required for McDonald to locate his “X” mark.
431. See supra notes 357, 371, and accompanying text.
432. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner, supra note 274, app. at 96.
433. Id. app. at 76.
434. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 461–62.
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together those responses in the confession.435 And despite a sustained objection,
Sheriff McGraw also blurted to the jury that he was able to confirm this opinion
by taking McDonald to Jackson, Mississippi, for a polygraph test.436 By this
time in the prosecution’s direct examination of Sheriff McGraw, the defense
had objected so many times that McGraw began answering questions after the
objection, but before the judge could rule on it.
Following Sheriff McGraw’s belligerent testimony, closing statements
were made. Later determined to be a “prejudicial statement, wholly
unsupported by any evidence,” the prosecution ended its closing statement
with, “Unless you find the defendant guilty, it will be a license for people to go
out and kill police officers.”437 Even though the defense’s immediate objection
was sustained, the damage was already done. Moreover, the judge declined to
grant the defense’s motion for a mistrial.438
With that, the jury deliberated for just over half an hour.439 The judge
instructed the jury it could choose from three possible verdicts: guilty with a
sentence of death, guilty with a sentence of life imprisonment, or innocent. The
all-white jury purposefully spared Chambers’s life, but found “the defendant
guilty as charged, and fix[ed] his punishment at life in the State
Penitentiary.”440 After the announcement of the verdict, the defense asked that
each juror be polled. “[E]ach of [the] jurors answered the Court that the verdict
of Guilty as Charged . . . [was] his or her separate and individual verdict in this
cause.”441
In the end, the question remains whether Chambers’s fate at the hands of
an all-white jury would have been any different had the prosecution not made
such a statement during closing, or had they not repeatedly raised the specters
of the Deacons and NAACP, or had the court not excluded the oral confessions.
Even if Chambers had been permitted to mount a complete and fair defense, it
is unclear whether the jury would have delivered a different verdict, not least
because in hindsight it is fairly clear that a Deacon—although probably not
Leon Chambers—shot Aaron Liberty.
The trial largely turned the words of white police officers against local
black men, many of whom were involved in civil rights activity and the
seemingly extremist Deacons. Not surprisingly, the jury seemed to give less
weight to the testimony of black witnesses than to that of whites.442 Although
no explicit recognition of witnesses’ race took place at trial or in subsequent
435. Id. at fol. 464.
436. Id. at fol. 466.
437. Id. at fol. 521.
438. Id.
439. “Guilty” Says Jury, NATCHEZ DEMOCRAT, Oct. 29, 1970, at 1.
440. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fol. 525.
441. Id.
442. See generally Carpenter, supra note 26; Michael J. Klarman, Racial Origins of Modern
Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48 (2000).
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appeals, repeated references to the Deacons and the NAACP were likely
sufficient to completely discredit those who testified on behalf of Chambers. 443
It is no surprise, then, that Chambers’s attorneys were ready to begin the
appeals process immediately. In addition to the defense team’s motion to set
aside the verdict, the team also moved for a new trial based on the exclusion of
evidence, refusal to permit the defense to treat McDonald as a hostile witness,
and denial of a trial “in accord with fundamental fairness guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment.”444 Both motions were promptly denied, Leon
Chambers was placed in Amite County jail,445 and a timely appeal followed.
2. Overturning the Conviction
While the primary purpose of this Comment is to unearth the history of
civil rights activity in Woodville, Mississippi, the true events of June 14, 1969,
and the fairness of Chambers’s trial, the appeals process is worth brief
examination because it sheds light on how the U.S. Supreme Court and the
justice system more generally can erase civil and political dissent from the legal
record.
Sitting on the Mississippi Supreme Court, waiting to hear Chambers’s
appeal, was Justice Thomas Pickens Brady. In 1965, Time referred to Justice
Brady as “the philosopher of Mississippi’s racist white Citizens’ Councils and
the polemical author of Black Monday, a Negro-baiting tract attacking the U.S.
Supreme Court’s 1954 school desegregation decision.”446 Still, Justice Brady’s
decisions from the bench often upheld civil rights legislation. In 1972, Justice
Brady told an interviewer that he was willing to side with the law in cases
involving civil rights because it was the law—but not because the law was
right.447 For example, Justice Brady overturned the conviction of two young
girls in a highly publicized case in which the girls received jail sentences for
entering an already integrated park.448
In contrast to the two young girls’ case, Chambers’s appeal must have
appeared to Justice Brady, and to the rest of the Mississippi Supreme Court
Justices, as unlikely to incite sympathy or a storm of media attention. The court
issued a short per curiam opinion confirming Chambers’s conviction on June
443. As late as 1979, a federal court overturned a black man’s conviction when the
prosecution’s closing statement included pointing out that no white person testified on behalf of the
black defendant. Carpenter, supra note 26, at 21.
444. Transcript of Trial Record, supra note 244, at fols. 530–31.
445. County Officers Named in Suit on Jury Selection, supra note 401, at 1.
446. Judges: The Education of Tom Brady, supra note 151, at 94 (quoting Brady as saying
“[t]he social, political, economic and religious preferences of the Negro remain close to the caterpillar
and the cockroach . . . proper food for a chimpanzee”).
447. Interview by Dr. Orley B. Caudill with Thomas Pickens Brady, Assoc. Justice, Miss. Sup.
Ct., in Jackson, Miss. (Mar. 4, 1972), available at http://digilib.usm.edu/u?/coh,9792 (last visited Jan.
25, 2013).
448. Judges: The Education of Tom Brady, supra note 151.
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18, 1971.449 Addressing the same set of facts presented to the U.S. Supreme
Court, the opinion honed in on both the preliminary hearing in which Gable
McDonald recanted his confession and on the probable coercive efforts of
Reverend Stokes in obtaining the written confession.450 Of the eight errors that
Chambers complained of, the court addressed only two. As to whether Gable
McDonald was a hostile witness, the justices concluded that McDonald’s
testimony “was not adverse to [Chambers], it was merely in McDonald’s
defense and in explanation of his rather unusual confession. Nowhere did
[McDonald] point the finger at Chambers.”451 Further, as to the error “in
refusing to admit testimony corroborating a third party confession after the
confession was introduced and supported by eye witness testimony,” the court
determined that the testimony of William Vaughn (who testified to seeing
McDonald with gun in hand in Gladys’s Cafe only after the shooting) and
Thomas Russ (who testified that he saw Leon Chambers at the time of the
shooting and attested that Chambers did not shoot Liberty) was sufficient to
corroborate the third party confession in the absence of the oral confessions.452
Thus, the court concluded there was ample evidence to support the lower
court’s holding, and accordingly affirmed the jury verdict.453
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Rodgers wrote that he was “convinced
that the testimony of the defense witnesses, Berkley Turner and Albert Carter,
should have been admitted in evidence to the jury.”454 Justice Rodgers
continued:
The court refused to permit the defendant to cross-examine
[McDonald] upon the ground that he was hostile. The defendant was
thus prevented from laying a predicate to impeach the witness. . . .
Gable McDonald was alive, not beyond the jurisdiction of the court,
and he did not object to being questioned in open court upon the
ground that his testimony might incriminate him.455
Justice Rodgers found credible the testimony that placed McDonald in a
position such that he could have shot Liberty: “[H]e was seen with a gun in his
hand at the time of the fatal shooting.”456 Consequently, Justice Rodgers would
have permitted the oral confessions to be entered into evidence, but he was
unable to sway even one additional justice to his side.

449. Chambers v. State, 252 So. 2d 217 (Miss. 1971) (per curium).
450. Id. at 218.
451. Id. at 220.
452. Id. at 219. The court went on to emphasize that Sam Hardin was also permitted to testify
that he saw McDonald shoot Officer Liberty, despite not being permitted to testify to McDonald’s oral
confession. Id. at 220.
453. Id.
454. Id. (Rodgers, J., dissenting).
455. Id.
456. Id. at 221.
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By the time the Mississippi Supreme Court denied Chambers’s petition
for rehearing in September 1971, Chambers was confined at Parchman
Penitentiary.457 By then, Chambers’s attorneys—West, Mullins, and Smith—
had exhausted their resources and capabilities on the case.458 Yet, not willing to
abandon Chambers, they turned to the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights.459
And in fact, the Lawyers’ Committee was already involved in Woodville’s civil
rights activities. In February 1971, the Jackson, Mississippi, branch of the
Lawyers’ Committee filed suit in federal court on behalf of James Williams,
Leon Chambers, and a few other named plaintiffs as class representatives
against several Wilkinson County officers including Sheriff McGraw and
Lenox Forman. The suit alleged that blacks in Wilkinson County had been
“purposely and systematically excluded from jury service” in the trials of the
named plaintiffs.460 However, for Chambers’s appeal, his lawyers contacted the
Washington, D.C., branch of the Lawyers’ Committee, which in turn doggedly
sent out the case for review.461
Finally, a young attorney named Peter Westen462 took Chambers’s case as
a pro bono matter. Westen was able to secure bond for Chambers—a “virtually
unprecedented decision” by Justice Powell.463 Accordingly, Chambers was
released from Parchman Penitentiary on February 1, 1972, on the conditions
457. For a historical account of life at Parchman Penitentiary, see DAVID M. OSHINSKY,
“WORSE THAN SLAVERY”: PARCHMAN FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE (1996).
458. Id.
459. Landsman, supra note 24, at 367–68. In his Evidence Stories chapter on Chambers,
Professor Landsman provides a more complete discussion of the case’s path to the Supreme Court
after the loss at the Mississippi State Supreme Court.
460. County Officers Named in Suit on Jury Selection, supra note 401, at 1.
The relief sought for the allegedly illegal master jury lists included injunctions prohibiting
defendants from further race discrimination in jury selection and prohibiting any criminal prosecution
of an African American from continuing until fair and legal jury lists were established. Id.
Unfortunately, no further record of this lawsuit can be located in the town’s newspaper or in online
databases.
The local Jackson branch of the Lawyers’ Committee, funded by the Ford Foundation, had a
small cadre of lawyers and several clerical staff at that time. All but one or two in the office were
white. The Lawyers’ Committee focused largely on voting rights and reapportionment. The
organization also represented Tougaloo students in large numbers and brought affirmative suits on
behalf of those who were beaten. Constance Slaughter-Harvey, who worked in the Jackson branch in
the late 1960s recalled having to file ten lawsuits just to get blacks in local jury pools. With the lawyer
and defendant often being the only blacks in the courtroom, the legal defense strategy in Mississippi
trials was exactly that of West and the rest of Chambers’s legal team: create a sufficient record upon
which to base a substantial appeal. Telephone Interview with Constance Slaughter-Harvey (Sept. 7,
2011) (notes from primary source on file with author).
461. Landsman, supra note 24, at 367–68.
462. Id. Professor Westen now teaches at the University of Michigan and has written
extensively about the doctrine set forth in Chambers.
463. Id. at 369. Landsman suggests that granting bail was a rookie decision by Justice Powell,
who had recently been appointed to the Court. Justice Powell thus essentially forced his colleagues on
the Court to grant certiorari so as not to belittle the new Justice’s judgment. Id. at 370. At the same
time, Professor Landsman concludes that Justice Powell, having lived his whole life in the South,
“could decipher the race-based message encoded in these facts.” Id. at 373.
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that he report regularly to Sheriff McGraw, live at home with his family, and
make efforts to secure employment.464 However, because this release came
without notice to Chambers’s family, he was forced to walk and hitchhike the
250 miles home to Woodville.465 Nevertheless, once home, Chambers would
not return to Parchman.
One year later, in February 1973, the U.S. Supreme Court announced a 7–
1–1 reversal of the Mississippi Supreme Court. Justice Powell spoke for the
Court: “[T]he hearsay rule may not be applied mechanistically to defeat the
ends of justice. . . . [W]e hold quite simply that under the facts and
circumstances of this case the rulings of the trial court deprived Chambers of a
fair trial.”466 Although apparently not inclined to agree with the majority’s
appraisal of the merits, Justice Rehnquist’s dissent did not reach the merits
since Chambers “failed to properly raise in the Mississippi courts the
constitutional issue that he seeks to have this court decide.”467
3. Chambers and Civil Rights in the News
The Woodville Republican tracked Chambers’s case through every step,
noting when it was heard in the U.S. Supreme Court and even reprinting a
Washington Post article that discussed the case without the traditional
hometown bias.468 The Post article astutely observed, “Blacks in Woodville,
the sheriff and even the editor of the local paper are all only vaguely familiar
with the questions that concern the justices in Washington. The legal
significance and the human significance of the case are two different things.”469
In March 1972, the Woodville Republican ran a front-page story with the
headline “Court Voids Conviction of Leon Chambers.”470 But besides the
announcement, the article noted little else. The white readers were apparently
unconcerned with the reversal, and, in fact, the prosecutor did not seek another
trial for Chambers. Both reactions are understandable given that there was little
civil rights activity in Woodville by that time. The controversy over
integration—which likely lent as much impetus to prosecute Chambers as the
shooting gave to the local movement—had resolved itself with all of the white
children attending private White Citizens’ Council schools and all of the black
students in a decreasingly funded public school system. Further, Forman had
464. Chambers v. Mississippi, 405 U.S. 1205 (1972) (opinion in chambers).
465. Interview with Sam Hardin, supra note 93.
466. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302–03 (1973). Justice White filed a concurrence
expressing concern over whether the Court had jurisdiction. But since the State did not challenge
whether the issue was properly before the Court, Justice White joined the majority’s opinion on the
merits. Id. at 307–08 (White, J., concurring).
467. Id. at 308 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
468. Chambers Case Heard Before Supreme Court, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Dec. 8 1972,
at 1.
469. Id. at 5.
470. Court Voids Conviction of Leon Chambers, WOODVILLE REPUBLICAN, Mar. 2, 1973, at
1.
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higher political aspirations, and any local prosecutor would have thought twice
before recharging Chambers with the murder, since this would have likely
attracted more national media attention and summoned further nonprofit
resources for the defense.
Although the legal significance of the decision has come to drown out its
civil rights origins, the nature of the case was apparent when the decision was
issued. First, the fact that Chambers’s attorney George West was able to
convince the Lawyers’ Committee for Civil Rights to take on the appeal
indicates that for at least one organization, Chambers’s case posed a significant
opportunity to create change in the Southern legal system and was worthy of
the organization’s limited resources. Second, the racialized context of the case
was not lost on the national media. Leon Chambers’s personal story was told
and retold in the New York Times, Washington Post, and L.A. Times.
The L.A. Times delved deepest into Chambers’s life in Woodville. Jack
Nelson, who won a Pulitzer Prize for his coverage of Watergate and was
recognized for his coverage of civil rights, reported the story.471 He described
Chambers’s family and occupation like most reporters, but also characterized
Chambers as part of a group of civil rights activists in Woodville that had
actively enforced the boycott of white stores against other blacks in the
community.472 While Nelson’s story dug into the society in which the killing
had occurred and alluded to the civil rights activity in Woodville, most other
articles focused more on the legal implications of the decision by detailing
aspects such as Justice Burger’s comments at oral argument473 or by simply
observing that the decision “[c]ut[] deeply into the power of states to control
their criminal trials.”474 In contrast, Nelson’s L.A. Times article made it clear
what was at stake for Woodville residents—the quality of life for real people,
the vindication of a right for a fair trial in the South, and to some extent, the
recognition of civil rights activists in the community.475 The media coverage
indicates that, despite being most affected by the Supreme Court’s decision, the
voice of Woodville’s black community remained marginalized despite
Chambers’s victory.
Yet those marginalized voices did have a few occasions to briefly shine
through. National news coverage of Woodville was not limited to Chambers’s
case. For a small, isolated, rural town, Woodville’s civil rights activity in the
late 1960s and early 1970s continued to make the back pages of national
newspapers. From voting rights to school integration, Woodville was finally

471. See Elaine Woo, Jack Nelson, 1929-2009; A Key Figure in Lifting Times Profile, L.A.
TIMES, Oct. 22, 2009, at A22.
472. Nelson, supra note 93, at 21.
473. See, e.g., MacKenzie, supra note 93.
474. John P. MacKenzie, Supreme Court Revises Two State Rules of Evidence, WASH. POST,
Feb. 22, 1973, at A21.
475. Nelson, supra note 93; Nelson, Supreme Court to Rule, supra note 268.
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experiencing significant changes in its social fabric and hierarchy. If faintly
heard on the national stage, Woodville’s marginalized voices had begun to ring
loud and clear in Wilkinson County.
III.

HIDDEN COMMUNITY ACTION
Over time, analyses of the Chambers opinion have obscured the history of
one rural Mississippi town’s efforts to win equal rights, and with it the
opportunity to understand Chambers as a civil rights case. The main goal of
this Comment was to recover that history and reframe our understanding of the
case. But in addition, the narrative of Woodville’s civil rights activity, hidden
beneath the surface of the famous Chambers decision, teaches a lesson about
the complicated role that law and litigation played in local civil rights
organizing in the 1960s. National litigation both helped channel local civil
rights activism and inspired local backlash. Yet rarely was civil litigation
mobilized as a tactic of the local movement. More commonly, local activists
attempted to change their daily realities through local economic boycotts and
extralegal direct action. In the gap between gains made by national litigation
and on-the-ground realities, it was primarily local law enforcement that
mobilized criminal laws to oppress movement activities and actors.
A. In the Gap: Law and the Local Movement
The excavated narrative of Woodville’s grassroots civil rights movement
reveals that national civil rights litigation was primarily a field of contestation
framing activities of both the movement and opposition. The narrative also
illuminates several instances of micromobilization of the law, primarily by the
countermovement against local blacks.
One of the first cases that appeared in the narrative was Brown and the
desegregation cases. In the late 1950s, a “separate but equal” school was built
in Wilkinson County to demonstrate that, contrary to the Supreme Court’s
decision, segregated schools could be both separate and equal. This act,
although controversial, resulted in quantifiably better facilities, if not
educational instruction, for blacks in the area. Thus, before the local movement
ever gained great strength, the national litigation strategy of the NAACP
shaped the terms of debate between pragmatic black educators and white
officials.476
Likewise a result of a national litigation strategy, the next major lawsuit to
appear in the narrative was HEW’s enforcement suit against several Mississippi
counties to force school integration. But in contrast to the separate-but-equal
school, this lawsuit directly named Wilkinson County, and Wilkinson County
whites actively fought back. In fact, the dispute between HEW and locals over
476.

See supra Part II.B.
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what type of integration plan would be put into effect spurred another strong
boycott demanding full integration. With tensions high prior to the approval of
the integration plan, a black police officer was killed and a civil rights activist
charged with his murder—adding even greater impetus to the movement and
increasing the stakes of the debate.477
When the federal district court approved HEW’s plan for full integration,
again the community responded. First, the local white community set up private
schools that maintained total segregation. Second, the black community
responded immediately with another boycott, although with less success than
prior efforts. The HEW desegregation lawsuit directly influenced the shape of
civil rights activities in Woodville. Though both the local movement and
Woodville whites directly reacted to the suit, neither blacks nor whites seemed
to act as participants in the suit. Rather, the suit’s driving force came from
outside the community. Nevertheless, it became a conduit for the direction of
the local civil rights movement and its opposition.478
In addition to suits that were part of a larger national civil rights litigation
strategy, the local movement frequently encountered micromobilizations of the
law as a social movement tactic used by the white opposition. Weaving in and
out of the local racial narrative are examples of the criminal law, and at times
civil suits,479 used to constrain and oppress the local movement and activists. In
what might be understood as an attempt to oust the first black elected official
since Reconstruction, local white officials ensured that James Jolliff was
prosecuted for, and convicted of, a felony for actions he took during a civil
rights protest.480 Similarly, criminal charges such as disturbing the peace and
obstruction of justice were frequently used to immobilize and detain civil rights
activists.481 In other instances, mass traffic ticketing was employed to harass
the black community during times of high tension or especially successful
boycott activities.482 Although not a mobilization of criminal law, the passing
of town ordinances to control mobility and assembly is another example of the
town’s use of the law to constrain the movement.483

477. See supra Part II.C.3.
478. See supra Part II.C.3. Another federal civil suit that enters the narrative is one brought by
the Attorney General against several Mississippi county registrars for evading federal inspections of
voter registration. That suit, however, seemed to have no effect on actual voter registration numbers,
and there is no evidence that the local NAACP mobilized around the litigation.
479. For example, Sovereignty Commission records indicate that Woodville officials and
merchants sought legal advice on how to file a suit against the NAACP and seek an injunction against
the boycott. Though this suit never came to fruition, its conceptualization is further evidence of the
opposition’s willingness—even eagerness—to turn to legal tactics. See supra note 198 and
accompanying text.
480. See supra notes 145–149 and accompanying text.
481. See supra Part II.C.
482. See supra Part III.B.
483. See supra Part III.B.
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Yet, at other times, law enforcement’s actions, or lack thereof, had
significant consequences for individual lives: officers looked the other way
when blacks were murdered484 and carried out beatings before executing an
arrest.485 Then, of course, there are the murder charges against civil rights
activists James Williams and Leon Chambers as an example of mobilization of
the criminal law against black activists with grievous consequences. Local law
enforcement and government officials went out of their way to secure charges
against the two men in the face of substantial evidence in favor of their
innocence.486
Within this context, it is important to consider white officials’ reframing
of the lawsuit that the Deacons allegedly used to bribe McDonald into giving a
false confession. White officials swiftly and severely dealt with these alleged
plans to sue the city for damages resulting from constitutional violations. First,
the potential use of a legitimate legal tactic to enforce rights against the town
was recast as an illegitimate scheme to steal money. Thus, officials discouraged
the use of the law as a tactic for local civil rights activism, and used it instead
as a tool of white oppression. Second, the government charged James Stokes,
an important Deacons leader, for soliciting perjury to ensure that he would not
be active in the litigation or supporting protest actions. Hence, while it appears
that the Deacons had begun to consider filing civil lawsuits against the town,
the white opposition likewise recognized the potential of such an action and
reacted accordingly.487
In fact, in the full scope of civil rights activity in Woodville, the law as a
social movement tactic was never central to the local movement’s strategy for
equal rights. Indeed, national litigation strategies resulted in the law serving as
a conduit for social movement activity and countermovement activity. On the
local level, law was primarily used to subordinate civil rights actors. More
generally speaking, the law constrains the possible directions for the social
movement and determines both the timeline and context in which conflicts
between the movement and the opposition occur. Accordingly, the law both
constrains and enables local actors in ways that can be hidden when focusing
on national litigation strategies.
Thus, the recovered narrative of Chambers provides a bottom-up
perspective on how local activists interacted with the law. By taking a U.S.
Supreme Court opinion that obscures its civil rights origins and examining
those origins, this Comment suggests that law’s impact on local social
movements is multidimensional and powerful. Given traditional and nowchallenged accounts of the civil rights movement that place litigation and law at
the heart of civil rights activism, law in Woodville’s narrative is almost
484.
485.
486.
487.

See supra Part II.B.
See supra Part III.A.
See supra Part III.
See supra Part III.
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omnipresent and yet hardly present in ways that are expected or central. It
constrains, enables, and obscures.
B. In the Gap: The Boycott and Armed Self-Defense
While national litigation and micromobilizations of the law have strong
presence in the recovered narrative, at the same time the “law” is absent. In the
absence of police protections for the local black community, black males
responded by mobilizing an extralegal self-defense group. In addition to
providing a bottom-up perspective of grassroots movements and the law, the
Woodville narrative also fits comfortably with the now substantial body of
literature on self-defense in the long civil rights movement.488 Although no
longer hidden from our histories of the civil rights movement, the Court’s
concealment of the armed self-defense actions in Woodville’s local movement
is a reflection of how national civil rights organizations helped to create an
image of the civil rights movement as a monolithic whole. National civil rights
organizations actively perpetuated a national nonviolent and religious image of
peaceful innocent blacks; the necessary self-protective measures, local violence
against the Klan, and intramovement strife were aggressively concealed to
ensure white northern sympathies and funding.
Yet the lack of state protection from physical and psychological violence
spurred and possibly necessitated the formation of groups like the Deacons for
Defense. Further, the only successful civil rights model in southwest
Mississippi likewise included strong physical and psychological enforcement of
boycotts within the local black community. The strategy taken in Woodville
reveals that self-protective action was a matter of course to guard against severe
Klan violence in rural areas. Armed patrols of black communities in addition to
guarded demonstrations and meetings were necessary for the movement’s
success.
Further, Woodville’s use of the economic boycott also pushes to the
forefront the whites’ attempt to turn the black community against itself.
Physical enforcement of the boycott is what made town officials succumb to
the activists’ demands. However, the necessity of enforcing the boycott
required some blacks to take action against others in their community. Thus,
attention was not focused solely on white oppressors, but instead divided within
the community.
Moreover, intracommunity tension found in Woodville is a sign of the
diversity of interests within the black community and the difficulty in any
social movement of finding a cohesive set of shared interests within a broad
and diverse group. The Woodville Deacons for Defense not only provided
armed protection against white nightriders, but also suppressed those within the

488.

See supra notes 30–36 and accompanying text.
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black community who did not participate in the movement.489 Intraracial
tensions were clearly present in the shooting of Officer Liberty. The shooting
of Liberty could very well have been a defensive act and may have even spared
lives. However, it is important to recognize the pressures placed upon Liberty
to serve as a police officer and the real consequences of Deacons acting as an
extralegal protective force.
Woodville’s local movement secured rights, safety, and justice without
using litigation tactics. Nevertheless, the movement’s activities, successes, and
defeats were intimately affected by national litigation strategies as well as by
the town’s small mobilizations of the law against individuals and the movement
itself—all of which were obscured by the opinion in, and subsequent analyses
of, Chambers v. Mississippi.
CONCLUSION
After examining the uses of the legal system against the black community
in Woodville and the response to that oppression, the absence of race in the
Supreme Court’s opinion is stark and almost flagrant. Perhaps only inference
and speculation can provide an explanation.490 Nevertheless, maybe the case’s
civil rights nature was obscured because it was not initially recognized by
locals or litigation-focused civil rights groups. Consider that the national civil
rights movement had selected civil suits to pursue legal change for African
Americans. Chambers’s criminal charges were of an inherently different nature,
and local jurisdictions controlled the initiation and structure of the case.
Further, none of the local activists suggested using a criminal suit as part of a
national litigation strategy to eliminate bias from southern courtrooms, and not
even Peter Westen took up the case with the immediate and specific goal of
protecting a black defendant’s right to a fair trail.491 Indeed, as Constance
Slaughter-Harvey from the Lawyers’ Committee remarked, many other civil
rights activists faced unfair trials just like Chambers,492 but there was no largescale social movement strategy in which Chambers’s attorneys could
participate that would change that fact.
The Chambers decision was the result of a little advance planning and a
considerable amount of luck. On one hand, details of the local struggle for
equal rights have little to do with the general principle of evidence that
Chambers has come to stand for. Yet on the other hand, those excluded details
are crucial to understanding why Chambers received an unfair trial and why
such pains were taken to ensure the jury never heard about the three oral
confessions. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court opinion still had the potential to
489. See supra Part II.
490. To some extent, Professor Landsman provides one reasonable explanation in Justice
Powell’s personal history. See supra note 463.
491. Id. at 367–68.
492. Telephone Interview with Constance Slaughter-Harvey, supra note 460.
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improve the fairness of criminal trials for black defendants. By prohibiting
hearsay rules that prevent defendants from mounting a full defense, the Court
took from the legal toolbox of both the prosecutor and judge and added to the
toolbox of the defense. Yet the appeals process and final opinion obscure the
civil rights activism underlying the case.
In the end, it may not have mattered whether Mississippi’s rules of
evidence and their enforcement at Chambers’s trial had been different. There is
no doubt that the trial judge admitted hearsay into evidence when solicited by
the prosecution. Although the Supreme Court’s decision eliminated one tool,
Klansmen as police officers and men like Lenox Forman as prosecutors would
likely have found other tools—like exclusion of blacks from juries—to convict
Woodville’s African Americans without a fair trial. Especially given that most
blacks in the rural South did not have the resources or luck to have talented
lawyers pursue their cases to the United States Supreme Court, the decision
may have had little impact for most black defendants in Mississippi. And even
despite the good fortune of having his conviction overturned, Chambers
nevertheless lived out the rest of his life with painful and debilitating head and
neck wounds.493
Yet when examined in both its larger and more localized contexts,
Chambers is the story of one community’s civil rights struggle during a time
when the law was both everywhere and nowhere. The story of Woodville’s
civil rights activists elucidates how one black community was empowered
through an open and sustained demonstration of self-defense and an assertion
of its own sense of justice. The shootout specifically illuminates the intensity of
subordination felt by those in the black community who acted as informants
and accommodationists. The black community combated the oppression on its
own terms and without the direct aid of national civil rights organizations or
outside volunteers. Woodville’s activists took armed, direct, economic action
against the white power structure and made much headway. The events that
sparked Chambers are just one example of that action.
In a way, this narrative underlying Chambers offers one last insight
beyond those applicable to the civil rights movement discussed here: even
jurisprudence that benefits marginalized groups may continue to obscure those
same groups. Perhaps the simple answer is that obscuring and suppressing the
gritty facts allows the Court to make rulings that appear neutral, emotionless,
and unbiased, and which are thus more widely accepted and politically feasible.
Whether that is true—and even more important, whether that is desirable—
must be the subject for further research. It would be inappropriate, however, to
assume that Chambers v. Mississippi is the only Court opinion that obscures the
true narrative, struggle, and oppression experienced by the litigants.494 Many
493. See, e.g., Nelson, Supreme Court to Rule, supra note 268.
494. See, e.g., Dale Carpenter, The Unknown Past of Lawrence v. Texas, 102 U. MICH. L.
REV. 1464 (2004).
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social movements use litigation as a publicity tool,495 and yet it is clear that the
Court has, in the past, hidden the “movement” nature of the opinion. And, as
many direct service lawyers already know, national legal rulings do not always
translate to justice on the ground. Why this happens and what that means for
modern day social movements pursing legal change must continue to be the
focus of research in the socio-legal community.

495. See, e.g., Scott Barclay & Shauna Fisher, Cause Lawyers in the First Wave of Same Sex
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